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4Abstract
This thesis explores a group of young Western-oriented Chinese consumers called 
xiaozi in Shanghai, comprised mainly by young individuals from an urban lower 
middle-class background who attempt at adopting a lifestyle and identity marked 
by a taste for fine arts and foreign culture. The study shows that by means of 
social distinction through taste and foreign cultural practices the xiaozi youth can 
attempt at acquiring cultural capital for upward social mobility, to compensate for 
their lack of economic capital or social connections in Shanghai's society. As 
such, the xiaozi lifestyle can function as a vehicle for social upward mobility, but 
most often functions as a coping strategy to assert themselves as high quality 
individuals despite their lower societal status. By rearranging the quality discourse 
to adhere to a transnational scale of stratification along an imaginary linear path 
towards modernization, the xiaozi can consider themselves to be at the forefront 
of Chinese society and justify their higher social worth. Their questioning of 
traditional definitions of high quality and parental expectations and their will to 
create a life that takes departure in their own individual happiness is analyzed as
an example of the macro-individualization process of Chinese social relations and 
new class-struggles in the stratification of China's emerging market-society. The 
thesis is based on data collected from participatory observation and interviews 
with 10 young Chinese individuals in Shanghai during the spring 2015.
Keywords: xiaozi, youth, distinction, social mobility, urban, middle-class, 
consumer culture, China.
51. Introduction
While in the high-end area Xintiandi in Shanghai, I was walking together with 
the 25-year old girl Lan, whom I had met in the Xintiandi Style Galleria. As we 
walked through the galleria I asked her what she thought of the place. She 
stopped, listened to the background jazz music, smiled and pointed with her 
finger to the air [referring to the music] and said; "Ah. It's very xiaozi!" When I 
asked what xiaozi meant, she answered that "...it means people below the 
middle-class who seek a more sophisticated lifestyle, but not like the richer 
Chinese people who only care for money and luxury items." In contrast, she said, 
xiaozi people use their limited amount of money to go to watch dramas, music 
festivals, have coffee, visit museums and buy art, to cultivate their "spirit". 
"Maybe we are trying to make our living style closer to the Western people, 
especially the middle-class. I think maybe those things are very normal for 
Western people, but not here you know..!"
The transformation of Chinese society from an isolated socialist society to a 
globally connected market society is a deep socioeconomic restructuring process 
which is still in its transition. The increased social mobility, economic wealth and 
influence from global culture and trade have had impact on all social relations, but 
youth and women in particular have benefitted from the transition to an emerging 
globalized market society in terms of heightened social status and power as 
consumers. Its effect reaches the level of individual identities as well, as profound 
social change leads people to reconsider their lives and take on identities which 
they feel best suit the new societal situation. In Shanghai, the most commercial 
and cosmopolitan city in the Chinese mainland, the young daily find themselves 
exposed to the individualistic values and practices of global consumer culture and 
need to position themselves within the new social and cultural field that is being 
created. In contemporary China the individual must pursue social status or social 
worth by showing outward cultivation, or high quality, and thus consumption 
habits are of particular importance for identity formation and social mobility. This 
6is particularly evident in the youth consumer culture which has emerged since the 
1990s, through which individual identity and social position can be expressed 
through consumer choices. Nevertheless, the youth's individual identity and 
opportunities for social mobility are still profoundly structured by their local 
social relations, with high reliance on and expectations from parents for social and 
economic success, and immense competition among peers which restrains their 
opportunities for upward social mobility and reach of a middle-class lifestyle.
Thus, many of the young Shanghainese who seek upward social mobility are 
structurally limited by their lesser economic means and few social connections, 
and in the new cultural field that is being created in Shanghai with influx of global 
consumer culture they have made it their strategy to adopt an individually 
fulfilling and transnational consumer lifestyle despite their lower middle-class 
position in society, to promote and possibly elevate themselves in society through 
sophisticated consumption. It is this social phenomena which this thesis describes; 
its cultural practices, meanings, and social implications. These young are called 
xiaozi, an urban social group which occupy a social space somewhere in between
the Western equivalents hipsters and yuppies. The xiaozi promote artistic and 
aesthetic values to distinguish themselves from the mainstream society, but are 
not countercultural nor political like hipsters; they embrace commercialism alike 
yuppies, but xiaozi are not as rich or part of an elite strata alike yuppies. What
these subcultures have in common is the same desire for setting themselves apart 
from mainstream society, which xiaozi youth do by appropriating global
consumer culture and prioritizing individual fulfillment before mainstream 
normative definitions of the ideal middle-class lifestyle. As such xiaozi is an
unique urban youth subculture inherent to the contemporary Chinese 
socioeconomic transition structure and regional globalization.
This study of xiaozi culture is situated in Xintiandi in Shanghai, locally known as
one of the most explicitly Western-oriented, sophisticated and hip entertainment 
areas in downtown Shanghai. Except for Helen Wang's limited comparative 
analysis of xiaozi subculture and middle-class culture in one of the chapters in her 
7book The Chinese Dream (2010) and three popular articles in CNReviews (2010),
Shanghaiist (2010) and China Daily (2012) on xiaozi subculture in Beijing and 
Shanghai respectively, there has been no coverage of xiaozi's in Western 
academic journals and media. This thesis aims to begin to fill this lacuna by 
exploring how this subculture departs from mainstream youth culture and how it 
relates to the macro-social process of individualization and globalization of 
Chinese society.
1.1 Purpose and research question
The purpose of this thesis  is to explore xiaozi subculture among young Chinese in 
Shanghai, to contribute to the anthropological understanding of how the 
increasingly global Chinese market-society is evolving. This research is relevant 
because of the lack of knowledge of the changing stratification in urban China in 
Western academia, and seeks to fill the research gap afore mentioned. 
Furthermore, case studies of Chinese society's modernization process also 
provides valuable knowledge for comparative research on the effects of 
modernization and individualization, which theory currently mainly is based on 
research in Western societies (see Bauman 2001; Beck 1992; Beck & Gernsheim 
2002; Yan 2009). 
I will argue that the xiaozi's lifestyle and values are a reaction to the mainstream 
discourse on ideal personhood and middle-class attainment in China. The xiaozi 
lifestyle is promoted by young low-middle class people who want to transcend 
local definitions of social stratification and use what they imagine as a
cosmopolitan practice to elevate their status in the emerging globalizing Chinese 
market-society. In order to demonstrate this argument, I will describe how xiaozi 
youth try to distinguish themselves from the mainstream by acquiring what they 
view as modern cultural practices and using this cultural capital to redefine the 
local Chinese categories of ideal personhood. I analyze the xiaozi as social 
phenomena as a case of social distinction, inspired by Bourdieu's theory (1984), 
and as part of the macro-individualization process of Chinese society, which has 
8begun to be outlined by Yan (2009). The following subset of questions guides my 
analysis:
- What defines xiaozi subculture to the young Chinese who define themselves as 
xiaozi?
- Why are some young Chinese attracted to the xiaozi lifestyle? Who attempts to 
become xiaozi?
- How do the xiaozi use foreign cultural practices to challenge domestic Chinese 
definitions of social stratification?
- How is the xiaozi subculture a reaction to the mainstream discourse on ideal 
personhood and middle-class attainment in China?
1.2 Outline of the study
In the next chapter 2 I describe my method for studying xiaozi subculture. In 
chapter 3 I outline my theoretical framework for analyzing social distinction and 
cosmopolitanism as cultural capital, and situate these theories in the Chinese 
context by describing the domestic discourse on ideal personhood and the 
importance of politics of recognition as the main manifestation of social 
emancipation in post-reform China. In chapter 3 I describe the social definition of 
xiaozi subculture, and present my ethnographic findings on the lifestyle and 
values of xiaozi youth in Shanghai. In chapter 4 I analyze xiaozi youth's struggle 
for upward social mobility through the lens of the theory on social distinction and 
cosmopolitanism in China, to answer my research questions and establish my 
argument that xiaozi youth's lifestyle is a reaction to the mainstream discourse on 
ideal personhood and middle-class attainment in China, promoted by young 
people who want to transcend local definitions of social stratification and use 
what they imagine as a cosmopolitan practice to elevate their status in the 
emerging globalizing Chinese society. The last section of the study concludes my 
findings and suggests possibilities for further studies. 
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2. Method 
2.1 Motivation for my choice of ethnographic fieldsite
The majority of social life occurs in the context of "fading away" and the "shading 
off" of space (Giddens 1984:132), and as such places function as a context, 
although not a determinant, for social interaction and cannot be fully separated 
from the socialization process. Places are not an inactive background to active 
social life, but norms, behavior and social relations are actively reproduced partly 
by how humans respond to how their surrounding space is constructed (ibid.). 
When entering the field in Shanghai, I found it necessary to limit my fieldwork in 
the metropolis to certain places where the xiaozi subculture is expressed and 
concentrated to specifically. The area Xintiandi was chosen deliberately for my
case study of xiaozi culture simply because it was defined by my initial 
informants as "a very xiaozi place", and as such the place also helped me to 
understand xiaozi culture and how Xintiandi's global, romanticized and 
consumerist features functioned as an spatial context for my informants living of a 
xiaozi lifestyle and attitude. Xintiandi's preservational features of Shanghai's 
colonial history and its selective historical narrative also made it particularly 
constructive for exploring the cosmopolitan elements of xiaozi culture. The 
previous literature which has discussed Xintiandi focus on its role in the 
ideological quest of making Shanghai a 'global city' (Wu 2000a, 2000b, 2002, 
2003a; Gabriel 2006; Luo 2011; Cheng 2012; Vaide 2015), as part of Shanghai's 
abrupt large-scale spatial transformation and social gentrification (Lu 2002; 
Gamble 2003; Xu 2004; He 2007, 2010, Xuefei 2008; Wang & Steven 2009) and 
as a case of global commercial place promotion (Wu 2003b; He & Wu 2004; 
Xuefei 2008; Wai 2006). None has previously undertaken any ethnographic study 
of Xintiandi. In total I spent 4 months in Shanghai from February until May 2015, 
continuously engaged in the field and with my informants. 
2.2 Ethnographic sample and sample method
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I focused my qualitative sample to ten young Chinese individuals between 21 and 
29 years old, all presently settled in Shanghai. Seven are female and three are 
male. The majority, seven of them, were sampled when they were visiting 
Xintiandi and correspond to the average consumer in Xintiandi; Chinese, young, 
lower middle-class or middle-class in terms of family annual income, and with a 
college education, still studying or with a professional occupation (He 2010:356).
The other three informants were selected specifically because of their different 
socioeconomic background; two college students with migration background, and 
one female elite young professional. The total number of informants was decided 
as I reached a point of theoretical saturation (Esaiasson et al. 2007:290-4), after 
which I conducted two more interviews to secure the internal validity of my 
findings. Aside from the elite young professional (who reported a annual family 
income of more than 200,000 yuan) all of my informants reported a family 
income between 20,000 to 100,000 yuan per year, which is considered as lower 
middle-class to middle-income level in Shanghai by He's statistics from 2010 (He 
2010). All the conversations were conducted in English, which did not seem to 
affect my sample as all the people I approached in Xintiandi were comfortable to 
converse in English. 
2.3 Guided conversations
The purpose of conducting interviews was to acquire qualitative data of "the lived 
experience of other people and the meaning they make of that experience"
(Seidman 2006:9). To acquire subjective and detailed data on the meaning(s) of 
xiaozi identity and culture I conducted guided conversations (Appendix I). I had a 
set of general questions which I wanted to have answers to and which guided the 
interview, but also left a lot of room for my informant to steer the conversation in 
the direction which was most relevant for expressing and grasping her/his 
experience and thoughts on Xintiandi and xiaozi culture in Shanghai. I 
intentionally situated us in situations which I understood was considered as being 
xiaozi, such as sitting in outdoor cafés and drinking coffee, to set us in a more 
interactive environment that would spark their ability to provide qualitative 
12
information about xiaozi culture and sociality. I also reconnected with all of my 
informants on Wechat, a Chinese chat forum, which enabled me to come back to 
them with follow-up questions, specifications and additional questions after the 
interviews as new data from new interviews and analytical insights emerged.
2.4 Non-participant observation and participant observation
In order to understand the identity politics of xiaozi culture - what it is, who they 
are, and why Xintiandi in particular is a xiaozi place, I also conducted participant 
and non-participant observation of groups and individuals matching my sample 
group. I was invited several times to join in events in Xintiandi with my 
informants, for example shopping during a creative sidewalk market for local 
artists, which I visited with two young girls, and to the Shanghai Fashion Week, 
which I visited with one of my male informants. During these occasions I 
carefully observed our experience and inquired about my informants views and 
thoughts. By using the information which I got from my informants on how to 
interpret xiaozi and determine what is xiaozi and what is not in participatory, I 
learned about the concept's meaning by taking part of Fashion Week, coffee-
drinking and shopping, and asking my informants of what they thought 
distinguishes xiaozi artifacts, behavior and mentality. 
2.5 Methodological considerations regarding my position as researcher
My subjective point of view as a researcher obviously influenced my access to the 
field, and the information which my informants shared with me. This was a 
positive thing in the sense that due to my personal characteristics as a young 
foreigner I could approach young Chinese people with ease, and it was through 
this entry point that I came in contact with the xiaozi subculture, which other 
researchers seem to have missed. Simultaneously my own position as a Western 
European foreigner was precarious, since my xiaozi informants obviously also 
considered Western culture and Western foreigners as people of high quality and 
somebody who they wanted to be associated to, which influenced our relationship. 
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This made it easy for me to meet new informants, and often made them very 
talkative and informative in my presence - however, I often became the subject of 
discussion and had to engage in the conversation in a way that inevitably
influenced my informants. For example, they often inquired my opinion on 
different fashions and behavior and wanted me to tell them my opinion in turn for 
theirs. I chose to respond and engage in mutual discussion since I soon learned 
that this was the most effective way to come closer to my informants and make 
them share more qualitative information and personal opinions. In order not to 
make use of biased data, I have made it clear in my presentation and analysis of 
how I have engaged in discussions and how my informants used me as their point 
of reference, in order to make the research process and epistemological production 
as transparent and reliant as possible.
2.6 Limitations and validity
My geographic limitation of the study to Xintiandi also implies some limitations 
to the sample of informants who I included in the study. Indeed, Xintiandi is only 
one arena for socialization of xiaozi culture in Shanghai. Nevertheless as it was
my informants who initially highlighted the xiaozi features of Xintiandi to me and 
pointed me into this direction for understanding xiaozi culture from the 
perspective of Shanghainese youth, my findings on xiaozi culture in Xintiandi 
should be considered as having high internal validity despite the study's 
geographical limitations. But as my findings add to a largely unexplored social 
phenomena the external validity must be considered to be limited, at least until 
further studies can contribute with validity from a larger sample size. The very 
limited coverage of xiaozi culture thus far only has confirmed its existence in 
Shanghai (Wang 2010; Chow 2010) and in Beijing (Laughlin 2012), although 
some informants implied that it also exists to varying extent in major Chinese 
cities such as Guangzhou and Shenzhen. As Shanghai is the most commercial and 
cosmopolitan city in the Chinese mainland and the main experimental site for 
producing the new modern Chinese market society (Deng 1994; Gamble 2003; 
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Wu 2000a, 2000b, 2002, 2003; Vaide 2015) it leads the country's market-
transition in many socioeconomic aspects, and is often considered to have a 
prominent role in starting cultural trends in China due to the relatively high 
financial, human and cultural capital among its population. But because of this 
specific economic and sociocultural context, such as the city's local cosmopolitan 
past, the large amount of foreigners living in the city and their impact on 
contemporary Shanghainese youth culture, and the high economic status which so 
many more young enjoy in Shanghai compared to other Chinese cities, the 
findings about xiaozi culture which are described in this thesis could probably 
only extend to Beijing and Guangzhou. 
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3. Theoretical framework
My argument that appropriating the xiaozi subculture becomes a vehicle for social 
distinction within the discourse on ideal personhood (quality) takes its departure 
in Bourdieu's theory on social distinction as a means of upward social mobility. 
First I present the theory in general, and then I link it specifically to 
cosmopolitanism as a type of cultural capital which can be used for social 
distinction. The latter two sections then situate the theory of social distinction and 
cosmopolitanism as cultural capital in the contemporary Chinese context by 
explaining the 'quality' discourse for social stratification in China, and how the 
appropriation of foreign culture and modernity in the form of embodied cultural 
capital is situated in this discourse. Then I present Yan's theory on the importance 
of politics of recognition as the main manifestation of social emancipation in post-
reform China, and how cosmopolitanism alike other forms of social distinction in 
China mainly expresses itself through consumption.
3.1 Bourdieu's theory on social distinction
In his theory on consumption and social distinction Bourdieu rejects the 
traditional notion in Kantian aesthetics that taste, and subsequently consumer 
choices, are the result of innate, intellectual and individualistic choices of 
aesthetic appreciation. Instead Bourdieu argues that the objects which consumers 
choose from reflects a symbolic hierarchy which is socially determined by the 
social class structure, and maintained by the socially dominant classes to 
distinguish themselves from the other lower classes in society, e.g. to maintain the 
cultural hegemony. The assertion of taste through consumption is thus always a 
symbolic act of social significance, in a politics of recognition of social status 
which is a power struggle over what is legitimate culture and what is popular 
culture. Therefore Bourdieu describes "taste" as a "social weapon" to mark off the 
high from the low, the qualitative from the vulgar, and which the higher classes 
use for maintaining social distinction by deciding what legitimate culture is and 
how it should be properly consumed (Bourdieu 1984:59). This concerns all 
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matters of consumption such as food, drink, art, music, literature, entertainment, 
cultural activities - Bourdieu argues that even the most mundane and functional 
items for consumption bear such symbolic significance. But equally it can be used 
as a social weapon for the lower classes as a means for upward social mobility. 
Alternative tastes can be promoted to contest the dominant cultural hegemony of 
what is legitimate culture, but more often taste is used as an individual strategy for 
upward social mobility in acts of appropriation of the legitimate culture, for 
example by consumption of objectified legitimate culture (fine arts, wine, opera, 
etc.) and/or embodying cultural capital by changing one's habitus (for example, by 
becoming a connoisseur) (ibid.:167).
Bourdieu argues that the cultural hegemony is maintained mainly because of the 
misrecognition made by the lower classes to think that choices of legitimate 
culture are a result not of socially structured judgments but of a specific cultural 
knowledge, more commonly known as "good taste" (ibid.). Due to the mistake of 
the dominated classes to associate culture with knowledge a middle-brow culture 
also has grown along with the increased social mobility and purchase power of the 
working and middle-class in modern societies, and Douglas and Anderson has 
argued that a whole industry has emerged specifically to cater the demands of 
individuals on the move upwards in modern society in search of legitimate 
cultural "knowledge" - books on wine appreciation, classics compilations, 
etiquette columns in newspapers - which preys on the insecurity which rests in the
belief that culture equals taste, and the subsequent belief that such cultural 
knowledge, or taste, is a vehicle for social mobility. "Indeed, as the endless 
cinematic retelling of the Pygmalion myth ("My Fair Lady", "Pretty Woman", 
"Working Girl", "Educating Rita", etc.) seeks to remind us, the only thing that 
separates the street vendor from the princess is a little cultural capital and a few 
elocution lessons." (Douglas and Anderson 1994:72). 
However, the realization that cultural capital can function as a vehicle for upward 
social mobility always must be coupled with an understanding of how its 
accumulation differs depending on the cultural context. In many contemporary 
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societies in which cultural hybridity and imaginations of globality are permeating 
cultural meanings, social scientists have pointed to how a specific form of cultural 
capital called 'cosmopolitanism' is increasingly used for social distinction by 
sophistication. But cosmopolitanism is an ambiguous concept with various 
terminological implications in different localities. In the next chapter I begin with 
presenting the theory of 'cosmopolitanism' as cultural capital and how it ought to 
be studied ethnographically. Then I describe how earlier scholars have analyzed 
cosmopolitanism in China, to draw upon for my own analysis of xiaozi youth 
culture.
3.2 'Cosmopolitanism' as cultural capital and power in the globalizing 
world
In recent years a more critical stance towards the concept of cosmopolitanism has 
emerged based in Bourdieu's theory on cultural capital, social distinction and 
stratification. Weenink (2008) has suggested that cosmopolitanism should not 
only be considered as the moral value of openness to the foreign, but should also 
be understood as a form of social and cultural capital. He uses Bourdieu's concept 
habitus to explain how cosmopolitanism is a set of "bodily and mental 
predispositions and competencies (savoir faire) which help to engage confidently 
in such [transnational activities]" (Weenink 2008:1092). Other more critical 
scholars have pointed to the fact that while cosmopolitanism promote humanistic 
values, it is in fact also deeply implicated with and dependent on economic 
inequalities and power relations in the globalizing world (Calhoun 2003, 2008; 
Harvey 2009). Calhoun has criticized earlier sociologists for presenting 
cosmopolitanism as "‘simply a free-floating cultural taste, personal attitude, or 
ethical choice’, decoupled from material conditions in which people’s lives are 
embedded" (2008:109) and called for a more critical inquiry of cosmopolitanism
as cultural capital from a class-perspective on social stratification. Despite that 
cosmopolitanism is a transnational form of cultural capital, its value as cultural 
capital for social distinction is embedded in its local domestic context. Robbins 
argue that "[t]he interest of the term cosmopolitanism is located (...)
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(paradoxically) in its local applications, where the unrealizable ideal produces 
normative pressure against such alternatives as, say, the fashionable 
hybridization’’ (Robbins, 1998:260; original emphasis). Ultimately 
cosmopolitanism is thus a fantasy of transcending the local, enabled by the 
imaginary of globality and its subsequent cultural competition, which is used as a 
cultural capital in local power struggles for social stratification (Skribis et al. 
2004:119). Because of the local dimension of transnational cultural capital the 
associations which the term 'cosmopolitanism' brings might be misleading. 
Therefore, despite that the term is being used by other scholars, I will use the term 
foreign cultural practices to better grasp the socializing process through which 
such transnationalism is culturally produced. 
In his critical inquiry of social and cultural stratification by globalization, 
Jonathan Friedman points out that the flows of culture in a globalized system 
often are taken for granted in social science and that the local social relations 
which structure the cultural production are neglected: "... to claim that culture 
today flows across the world, filtered through states, markets, movements and 
everyday life (Hannerz 1992), is to assume these structures are the units between 
which flows occur and are not themselves structured and transformed by global 
relations." (Friedman 2000:638). Such an assumption ignores how culture 
inherently is attributed meanings, which must be actively maintained in order to 
continue to exist. Friedman therefore suggests that social scientists should seek to 
understand the local socialization processes of cultural production of 
hybridization and transnationalism, and not just take for granted that the same 
image which travels around the world is maintained with same meaning in 
different localities and produce the same social transformation - but that they do 
create a field in which humans with different cultural backgrounds must position 
themselves in relation to foreign cultural phenomena. "[S]uch processes do create 
a field in which shared experiences and shared modes of meaning attribution are 
effected. Such fields might be said to be fields of resonance in which what 
Mannheim referred to as conjunctive communication can occur. Such fields are 
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hierarchical. They are also the fields within which shared cultural forms are 
created." (ibid.:646).
Friedman argues that one of the effects of hierarchical cultural production along 
global lines of stratification in the local field is the emergence of global elites and 
transnationalism as their dominant ideology. Friedman points to that such 
transnationalism "... polarizes the cosmopolitan with respect to the local and 
defines the former as the progressive" (Friedman 2000:649), as the higher moral 
state and civilized mode of being in the global world, as opposed to the backward, 
reactionary and pre-global local mode of being of the non-cosmopolitan lower 
subjects. The desire by global elites to transcend their local boundaries and the 
power with which they try to dominate the discourse on legitimate culture in the 
cosmological structure of the global system is an important social force which acts 
in the local fields where cultural production occurs and shapes the formation of 
social relations, not only those between the global elites and the people they have 
immediate power over, but also by how the elites' transnational ideology affects 
normative hierarchies of what is 'high' and 'low' cultural capital in society (ibid.).
Several other scholars have argued in line with Friedman that cosmopolitanism -
which I argue is better described as transnationalist ideology and foreign cultural 
practices - is increasingly becoming a locus of social stratification on global scale, 
thus an increasingly important form of cultural capital in the struggles for 
dominant positions in societies in a globalized world (Igarashi and Saito 2014; 
Kim 2011; Weenink 2007, 2008; Weiss 2005). By using Bourdieu's theory on 
social distinction and misrecognition, they have all made ethnographic inquiries 
of how foreign cultural capital is used as a means for social distinction vis-a-vis 
others, as it is expressed as a specific "knowledge" which they use to distinguish 
themselves as more cultivated and self-developed, and misrecognized by their less 
fellow citizens as a result of their situatedness in a broader social structure (such 
as the neoliberal world economic system). Foreign cultural practices (and the 
economic means which is needed to pursue such a lifestyle) thus become a means 
for social distinction, a type of cultural literacy and taste which is assumed to be 
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acquired by consuming the foreign and being able to engage confidently in its 
cultural practices - just like in other elite culture, such as opera or fine dining. 
Friedman's critical model for studying the transnational extension of class-
structures as a process of cultural production and socialization in a global world 
system, indeed sets one better capture the implications on local level of 
globalization, and to analyze how the hierarchical polarization of the 
'transnational' higher echelons of societies versus the 'local' lower classes is 
embedded in economic realities and power relations.
China is no exception to this trend, but as implied earlier, the cultural value that 
foreign culture has in China and how it is expressed and used for social distinction 
is embedded in the (many) local Chinese context(s). Lisa Rofel has described this 
as a "cosmopolitanism with Chinese characteristics", "a self-conscious
transcendence of locality, posited as a universal transcendence, accomplished 
through the formation of a consumer identity; and a domestication of 
cosmopolitanism by way of renegotiating China’s place in the world" (Rofel 
2007:111). Rofel's use of the word cosmopolitanism and 'universal transcendence',
despite the more important domestic aspect of consumption of foreign objectified 
cultural capital as a means for social distinction, is conceptually misleading
because the statement that such cultural capital is used "by way of renegotiating
China's place in the world" also makes it seem like this is a negotiation process 
between Chinese and people of other nationalities, while it is in fact a domestic 
class struggle in which acquisition of foreign cultural capital is used as a means 
for status. It also misses to clarify the important point which Yan has made, that 
the foreign, and especially the Western, to many Chinese also means 'modern', so 
that in the Chinese context the perception of 'cosmopolitanism' must be 
understood as implicated with the understanding and definition of modernity (Yan 
2009:254). Song and Lee argues that the ability to engage in foreign cultural 
practices in China is an elitist form of cultural capital, closely connected to the 
unequal modernization process and the inflows of global capital in China, and 
accessed by those who can afford it and who desire it as a means to transcend and 
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overcome an imaginary "peripheral position" in the global world (Song and Lee 
2012:346). Cosmopolitanism in China is thus less defined as a mental 
predisposition of being able to feel home anywhere, but rather as the imagined 
cultural knowledge to be able to behave in accordance with foreign norms and 
expectations in transnational, 'modern' environments in terms of tastes and 
cultural practices. Song and Lee argue that such cosmopolitan imagination as
local cultural capital in China mainly centers around the ideology of consumption
(e.g. a certain "taste" for foreign things) and "aspirationalism" which they explain 
as upward social mobility by consumption (ibid.:364). ). This observation 
explains the status which foreign culture has in China and why xiaozi youth may 
adopt foreign cultural practices as a strategy for social mobility, but it also 
challenges Song and Lee's assumption that only rich Chinese individuals attempt 
at establishing a 'cosmopolitan' identity. Again, because of this aspirational
approach to and conceptualization of transnationalism, Rofel's and Song and Lee's 
use of the term 'cosmopolitanism' might be misleading to apply to the Chinese 
context, which is why I instead use the term 'foreign cultural practice' to grasp the 
multiple implications with the ideas of modernity that the foreign has in my 
Chinese informants minds. I use the term foreign cultural practices because it 
transcends American and European culture, also including Taiwainese, Japanese 
and South Korean practices.
The importance of foreign and modern cultural capital for social stratification in 
China is also evident by its place in the discourse on what constitutes ideal 
personhood, or a high quality person. In the intense competition for social 
mobility, especially among the young, appropriation of foreign cultural 
knowledge and manners has become an important means for compensating for 
their lack of other forms of cultural, social or economic capital, such as high 
family income or academic success, in the formation of an identity of ideal 
personhood. In the next section I will try to describe how the aspirations toward 
foreign tastes and manners mix with the local Chinese concept of status definition, 
or 'the person of quality'.
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3.3 The ideal Chinese youth: educated, modern, 'cosmopolitan', and 
civilized
In relation to the envisioned market-transition and macro-change of Chinese 
society, the term gao suzhi, which translates into 'high quality' (as opposed to 
suzhi di, 'low quality'), began to be used in the Communist Party of China's (CPC)
official rhetoric in the 1980s to explain and legitimize the one-child policy as a 
necessity for the development of a next generation of Chinese children of high 
quality, for the purpose of raising the average standard of the Chinese population 
and culture (e.g. the emergence of a Chinese middle-class) which previous 'low 
standard' in a 1988 report by the State Council was argued to be the main 
impediment on China's economic development (Greenhalgh 2003, 2005a, 2005b; 
Greenhalgh and Winckler 2005; Murphy 2004). Anagnost has suggested that the 
official discourse initially was inspired by the Taiwanese author Bo Yang's 
influential essay "The Ugly Chinese" (Choulou de Zhongguoren) from 1985 
which criticized Chinese culture for impeding its civilizational development, and 
that it spread to become a popular discourse among the Chinese populace through 
the 1988 PRC television series "River Elegy" (Heshang) which was based on the 
State Council report and blamed China's economic shortcomings on Chinese 
culture (Anagnost 1995:25). A few years later in 1993 the educational campaign 
"Education for Quality" (Suzhi Jiaoyu) was launched nation-wide, which called 
upon teachers to change the focus of schooling from tedious exam-taking only to 
produce more "all-rounded" citizens of high quality, by emphasizing the 
importance of physical, political, social, artistic, technical and practical skills for 
high quality attainment as well as academic success. Officials, and parents with 
them, were worried about how the educational system seemed to produce 
unhealthy and asocial young citizens, and exhorted teachers to emphasize other 
activities such as sports and arts, to relax and cultivate the Chinese young (Fong 
2007:99). From being used as an official term quality has evolved into a popular 
discourse among the Chinese populace through state propaganda, media, the 
education system and popular culture, and has become one of the most all-
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encompassing and frequently contested discourses on social distinction (and 
subsequently, social worth) in post-Maoist China. The discourse has 
predominantly been projected on the younger generation Chinese born in the late 
1980s and onwards, and in particular on the young urban 'singletons', as the one-
child policy was implemented with foremost emphasis in the bigger cities (Fong 
2007:88). Although the discourse on quality stems from the CPC's defined 
rhetoric, the popular discourse which has evolved is much more diverse due to its 
daily interpretations and contestations in Chinese society. 
Quality is an intersectional concept of identity, predominantly defined by formal 
education level and urban lifestyle (as opposed to countryside agricultural 
lifestyle) but in intersectional combination with other characteristics of embodied 
cultural capital such as civility (wenming), cosmopolitanism, and overall sense of 
modernity (Anagnost 2004; Fong 2007; Jacka 2009; Murphy 2009). The discourse, 
which is closely related to the emergence of a 'Chinese Dream' (described as the 
belief that one can change one's fate through intelligence and hard work) with the 
increased social mobility which has come along with the market transition (Yan 
2009:xvii), has created great expectations and pressure from society, parents, 
peers and the individual itself on the first generation Chinese born into market 
society to become economically and socially successful, and for a young urban 
Chinese person it is deeply insulting to be accused to be of low quality, which is 
implying that one does not live up to the expected standard of embodiment of 
ideal personhood (Fong 2007:86). Simultaneously the reality which Chinese 
young face today is that only a few of the many urban ambitious young can reach 
the social and economic success which they have been raised to expect and dream 
of. The construction of the Chinese educational system, which demands long 
hours of studies and extremely high academic attainment in all subjects to enter 
university, still offers very few opportunities, which has resulted in fierce 
competition for social upward mobility among a generation of urban singletons 
(ibid.:101). Most often the young try to cope with this problem by seeking further 
education opportunities, but as Fong's ethnographic findings show, they also 
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attempt to shift the discourse on quality towards their own favor. Young Chinese 
individuals thus tend to promote different characteristics of what foremost defines 
high quality that favors their own personal strengths: highly educated individuals 
highlight the importance of academic attainment, while the academically 
unsuccessful emphasized cosmopolitan experiences and 'modern' appearance and 
attitude; wealthier youth highlighted possession of expensive and cosmopolitan 
hobbies and talents; and poorer argued that patriotism and good citizenship was 
the foremost indicator of high quality (ibid.:94). Due to the limited opportunities 
of institutionalized cultural capital in the form of elite education and profession, 
other forms of cultural capital seem to have emerged as strategies for acquiring 
high quality status. Anagnost argues that:
"Suzhi’s sense has been extended from a discourse of backwardness and development (the quality 
of the masses) to encompass the minute social distinctions defining a ‘person of quality’ in 
practices of consumption and the incitement of a middle-class desire for social mobility." 
(Anagnost 2004: 190)
Such minute distinctions of defining what is high quality behavior and what is not 
are contested daily by people in social interaction through condemnation and 
appropriation. In a discussion among three of Fong's informants, one boy, who 
was a high-performing student, said: "Quality is being good at your job, having an 
education, and causing people to respect you. High quality people don't use dirty 
words or spit on the ground, not even when other people are not around". But his 
more socially minded friend contested him by saying that a high-quality person 
rather is "Someone like Bill Gates. He didn't finish college, but he had creativity 
and the ability to get things done. You don't have to have a college education to 
have high quality. You can see high quality in someone's expression, language, 
and speaking ability. Quality is an overall evaluation." And yet the third friend, 
who had more of a bookish skill for language and programming, added: "I heard 
that in the 21st century, everyone will have to know English and computers to 
have high quality." (Fong 2007:94-5). 
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Certain elements of xiaozi subculture can be discerned here in the discourse on 
quality, namely the emphasis on appropriation of foreign culture and its perceived 
modernity as a form of cultural capital which is considered to signal high quality 
among Chinese youth. This symbolic hierarchy and its reinforcement of social 
structures in China has been captured by Yan (2009:114) in his description of how 
rural migrant youth who return to their home villages after working in the city 
continue to wear their expensive and trendy leather shoes even when working in 
the fields, despite the judgmental and doubtful looks from the older generations (a 
behavior perhaps similar to the Congolese 'La Sape' dandy migrants in Paris; see 
Tamagni 2009). The hierarchical symbolism of the urban-modern-foreign 
evidently holds legitimate value among Chinese youth, however, as displayed in 
the conversation above the value of its various aspects can be and is being 
contested and downplayed by young Chinese in order for the quality concepts'
symbolic hierarchy to affirm their own strengths as the most valuable. The scope 
and intensity of the quality discourse in Chinese society is a confirming example 
of the importance of personal identity for social status and social mobility in 
contemporary China, which Yan argues depends on the structural features of the
society's current individualization process.
3.4 Structural possibilities for social distinction and social mobility in 
China
Yan has argued that the modernization of Chinese economy [the regional 
emergence of market economies, economic development and opening up to global 
trade and consumerist culture] indeed also has led to increased social mobility 
with the emancipation of the individual from traditional social institutions, similar 
to how modernization has led to individualization in Western societies (Giddens 
1991; Bauman 2001; Beck 1992; Beck & Beck-Gernsheim 2001). But the 
individualization process in China differs from that in the West because of its 
authoritarian implementation from top-down, in contrast to Western countries 
where the established state-individual relationship has taken its departure in 
individual rights movements from bottom-up. Due to this structurally different 
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mode of state-directed individualization in China and its contextual differences 
such as its departure in socialist society and lack of cultural democracy, Yan 
argues that a different individuality in social relations, means for social mobility
and conceptualization of individualism from that in the West has emerged in post-
reformist China. This is also the case in the nuclearization of Chinese family 
relations and the subsequent empowerment of youth (and children and women) as 
post-socialist consumers, which has been one of the most profound
individualizing social structural changes during the 1990s and the 2000s (Yan 
2009:xxiii).
The one-child policy from the 1980s and the increased wealth has resulted in a 
nuclearization of urban Chinese family relations, something which follows a 
global trend despite being implemented by CPC legislation in Chinese cities 
(ibid.:xxii). But as Yan points out, it is not the size of the nuclear family that is the 
causally relevant factor but "the modernity of the contemporary family lies in the 
rising importance of individual desires, emotions and agencies in family life, on 
the one hand, and the centrality of the individual  in family relations, on the other 
hand" (ibid.:xxiv). While the one-child policy enforced a centering around one 
child in Chinese family relations, simultaneously the Chinese state rolled back its 
social security net and let market mechanisms take over many social security 
functions to manage the budgetary deficit which was accumulated under state 
socialism. Yan argues that because of the long history of collective social 
organization in China, the work unit social organization which was formed during 
state socialism, and the fact that the contemporary Chinese state provides the 
Chinese individual with less institutional social welfare security than their 
European peers, Chinese individuals are still largely dependent on and embedded 
in collective family social relations, social guanxi networks (a native Chinese term 
for social relations based upon mutual dependence and trust) and migrant ties, 
both overseas and in the mainland. The Chinese societal structure thus makes the 
emancipation, or re-embededdness, of the Chinese individual from its 
socioeconomic origin dependent on its social network, which is the same point 
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where such individualistic disembeddness begins (ibid.:289). Therefore the 
politics of emancipation in China mainly manifests itself in personal politics of 
identity, as social mobility is so dependent on personal network and social status
in the emerging Chinese market society. Yan contrasts this to the institutional 
mechanisms for social mobility which are available for citizens in European 
welfare states to varying extent. He suggests that the best comparable example 
probably is the US, where social mobility also to a larger extent is determined by
family networks and social status (ibid.:291). 
These socioeconomic factors have resulted in a change in the Chinese nuclear 
family's household expenditure in favor of investment in the singleton children's 
education and personal development - for example, even the average working 
class family in Shanghai spends (or, invests) around a third of their monthly 
income on their one child, in the quest of creating an individual with the highest 
possible human and cultural capital and access to a higher social status. The fierce 
competition for social mobility thus takes place in the corporeal politics of 
producing one child of the highest possible quality, as economic capital is 
invested in piano lessons, English lessons on the weekend, private tutors, 
fashionable clothes and restaurant visits, aimed at raising and creating a 
personhood and lifestyle which is distinctly upper middle-class in its cultural 
orientation (ibid.:266; Davis 2000). While this is happening in other parts of the 
world as well, in particular in East Asia, the rapid forced nuclearization of urban 
Chinese families, also among lower middle-class and working class families in the 
metropolitan cities, has created a different individualization of family relations 
without individualism, (Yan 2009:xxxii) where the individual child is the focus of 
family relations, but the determination of the individual identity of the child is still 
deeply embedded in the families social identity, norms and tradition. Thus while 
the nuclearization of urban family relations has empowered the young generation
through increased opportunities for upward social mobility and support for and 
focus on their individual success, their ability to benefit from such opportunities
in a Chinese market society is still very much dependent on parental (and 
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grandparental) socioeconomic support, or their guanxi network, and their ability 
to accumulate such an ideal personhood. Therefore Yan argues that the politics of 
identity and recognition in Chinese society relate even more to the redefinition of 
social status for social mobility, than to the search of the ultimate individual self
as the family still remains the main point of reference for self-identity (Yan 
2009:288). Therefore, the identity politics of consumerism is at the core of 
identity formation, social emancipation and social stratification for the individual 
Chinese.
Because of the context-specific constraints for individuality and social 
emancipation in China when compared to European welfare states, Yan also 
argues that a different concept of individualism has emerged in China and 
especially among the younger urban generation who has been brought up in the 
cities in the post-reformist era. Yan argues that the managing role of 
individualization by the party-state and the subsequent absence of individualism 
in the process of individualization has created a concept of individualism that is 
rather that of a post-socialist consumer; an utilitarian understanding of 
individualism (e.g. egotism) as a means for personal fulfillment and social 
mobility (as compared to the Western concept of individualism as the freedom to 
choose one's owns life), which contemporary Chinese youth has obtained through 
politically legitimizing propaganda of and by global consumption culture, the 
centrality of the one child in urban family relations, and the dependence on social 
status for social mobility in the emerging Chinese market society (ibid.:xxix; 
Davis 2000). This argument is also in line with Rofel's and Song and Lee's 
argument of how cosmopolitanism in China as a means for social distinction 
mainly is expressed through consumption (Rofel 2007:118; Song and Lee 
2012:364). However, the 'authenticity', or capacity of intellectual appreciation, of 
such form of objectified 'cosmopolitanism' can be contested in the struggles for 
dominant positions and social stratification by other social groups, and this is the 
soft spot which xiaozi youth prey on - the aspiring cosmopolites of China.
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3.5 Summary
In the contemporary globalizing world the ability to appropriate and express 
foreign cultural practices, especially Western consumption habits, is increasingly 
becoming a locus of social stratification on global scale, and thus an increasingly 
important form of cultural capital for social distinction in the struggles for 
dominant positions in local societies. In China such appropriation of the foreign is 
part of the discourse on ideal personhood and as such a valuable form of cultural 
capital. Due to the specific constraints for individuality and the importance of 
identity politics of consumerism for social emancipation in Chinese society, 
cosmopolitanism is mainly expressed in acts of objectified cosmopolitan 
consumption for social stratification, such as expensive cosmopolitan hobbies or 
acquisition of foreign cultural objects. In the next chapter, I will describe how 
xiaozi youth in Shanghai use cosmopolitanism as a means for social distinction 
and attainment of high quality status. In order to demonstrate this argument, I will 
describe the specific pro-Western and modern values which xiaozi youth promote, 
how xiaozi youth distinguish themselves from the mainstream, and how their 
claims for social distinction are condemned by other non-xiaozi youth.
30
4. Xiaozi politics of identity: distinction and recognition
The empirical chapter begins with an introduction to xiaozi lifestyle; what has 
been written about it thus far and what the popular definition of the term is. In the 
subsequent chapters I dwell deeper into how my informants define what 
distinguishes xiaozi youth - their values, habits and views on the mainstream 
society from which they are trying to distance themselves. I begin with describing 
how my informants orient themselves towards a global scale of stratification to set 
themselves apart from and to reposition themselves within Chinese society. Then I 
describe the xiaozi's expressions of identity through consumption and habits and
probe deeper into the socialization process of how they acquire cosmopolitan 
cultural capital to distinguish themselves from other social groups. Lastly I 
explore the deeper psychological predispositions which seems to compel xiaozi 
youth to part from the mainstream norms of middle-class society and renegotiate 
their position as high quality people despite their alternative lifestyle.
4.1 What is xiaozi?
The term xiaozi translates into 'petit bourgeois', but my informants used the 
translation 'small capitalist' to explain it in English. They always used the 
Chinese term xiaozi in conversations to express and emphasize its specific
cultural meaning embedded in the Chinese cultural setting. The contemporary 
literature on xiaozi culture is currently rather limited, probably due to the fact 
that the xiaozi is a relatively new urban social group since a few years back 
which has emerged as the Chinese market transition has matured and social 
mobility has begun to diversify Chinese society, especially in the urban areas. 
The xiaozi was first depicted in the online magazine CNReviews in 2010 by the 
Chinese journalist Elliot Ng, who had picked up the slang word over dinner with 
friends. When asking his friend what it means, she said: “I don’t know how to 
translate it. People who are xiaozi like Western things, like to drink coffee at 
cafes… Shanghai is very xiaozi.” Ng set out to consult his friends and Twitter 
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for what it means and how the term is being used, and a wrote an "attempt at a 
definition" of xiaozi as:
"... people who enjoy fashion, brands, hobbies, and free thinking that is inspired by Western 
commercial and artistic culture. Similar to “yuppies” in the sense of youthful materialism, the term 
also carries overtones of the creative, free-thinking state of being “hipsters.” However, this 
creativity and free-thinking is only within the bounds of what is socially acceptable within the 
xiaozi norm. There are many positive attributes of xiaozi. To some it is a put-down. But to others, 
it is a compliment. Still others might use the term in a self-deprecating way to describe 
themselves." (Ng 2010).
The article was reposted at the local Shanghainese expatriate-oriented magazine 
Shanghaiist by Elaine Chow, with the statement that xiaozi is 'a new breed in 
China', a statement which was contested by a Chinese individual in the comment 
thread who argued that the term had been used in Chinese social life since the 
beginning of the 2000s (Chow 2010). In her depiction of the Chinese middle-
class Wang (2010) explains that xiaozi historically referred to a specific social 
group in Maoist socialist class-society, namely the city dwellers who may have 
worked as government functionaries, owners of small businesses, or intellectuals. 
They were considered the 'petit bourgeois' according to the Marxist class-
definition because they made a commercialist living, but in contrast to the 
oppressive feudal class, who were considered the real bourgeois, they differed in 
income-level, political power and occupation. But according to both my own 
informants, and a girl interviewed on the topic in Beijing in 2012, "I think you 
should leave what Mao said behind. I think what you want to know about xiaozi is 
very different from what he meant." (Laughlin 2012).
While xiaozi's original meaning 'petty bourgeois' refers to a specific place in the 
Chinese class-structure, my informants explained to me that in contemporary 
Chinese social life xiaozi rather means a certain lifestyle and "carpe diem" 
attitude towards life: "a type of spirit" and "a way of living", thus a social code 
which is expressed through a certain culture of consumption, and no longer a 
socioeconomic class defined by its productive occupation as it was in Maoist 
China. Ng writes: "The original “petty bourgeoisie” were the merchant, 
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shopkeeper, small business owners. But today’s xiaozi are not defined by how 
they make money, but how they spend it. The term, once used to mark those on 
the wrong side of the revolution, has now been co-opted by popular culture to 
mean something entirely different and not entirely negative." Xiaozi thus refers to 
a lifestyle (as opposed to class in sociological terms) of a group of young people 
who are slightly below or lower middle-class by Chinese economic definitions -
defined by Wang as having about a third of their income available for 
discretionary consumption (Wang 2010:xv) - and not part of the artistic urban 
population, which is what my Chinese informants defined as Chinese hipsters,
but occupy a social space somewhere in between. Laughlin writes that according 
to her interviewees "the typical xiaozi net income is anywhere from 5,000 yuan 
($794, or 612 euros) to 20,000 yuan a month, but that living the xiaozi life is more 
about attitude than earning power." (Laughlin 2012). Thus xiaozi should not be 
interpreted as a social class in itself, but as a lifestyle adopted by people from 
the lower middle-class. Below, I present a suggestive graph of contemporary 
urban Chinese society inspired by Bourdieu's (1984) diagram for depicting 
social classes and their distinctive consumption habits.
                                                High economic capital
                    Political and financial elite                                    
                                                 Middle-class (zhongchan)
High cultural capital  Xiaozi (petit bourgeois)                  Low cultural capital
                                                                                                                            
                                                Artisans                              Workers (gongren)
                                                                                                              
                                                                                                    The poor (xiaokang)
                                                  Low economic capital
In her Shanghaiist article Elaine Chow describes xiaozi as "the Chinese yuppie", 
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but in the comment thread such a definition is contested as being an 
Americanized interpretation. Another reader suggests that xiaozi reminds more 
of the American Bobos - the bohemian bourgeois, who have creative and well-
paid jobs but promote a bohemian lifestyle, and denounce white-collar
mainstream cultures commercialist values despite embracing capitalist economy
(Brooks 2000).
As it turns out, neither comparison seems to fit perfectly to the xiaozi, apart
from the equally accurate observation of the xiaozi as less as a coherent social 
class but as an aspirational lifestyle (and not countercultural) which attempts to 
distinguish itself from the growing Chinese middle-class and white-collar sector. 
My informants generally defined xiaozi people as young people who 1) have
enough money to spend on discretionary consumption but are not really rich; 2) 
have a outspoken preference for Western culture to Chinese; and 3) have an 
allowing attitude towards spending money on art, fine dining, shopping and 
travel for pure personal gratification. According to Wang Chinese "associate the 
middle-class with cars and houses, and xiaozi with candlelight dinners and a 
glass of wine" (Wang 2010 in Laughlin 2012), which implies that even though 
they do not have the money to buy a bottle, they do have the foreign taste to buy 
a glass of wine. Mostly xiaozi were also referred to as female, and it was mostly
my female informants who defined themselves as xiaozi. All pictures online 
which are supposed to represent xiaozi depicts young, Western-fashioned 
women (Ng 2010; Chow 2010; Laughlin 2012; ForeignCN 2015). On the 
website ForeignerCN, where xiaozi is presented as a popular Chinese word in 
their training section for practical Chinese language skills, it is suggested that it 
is mainly urban single women below 30 who are being called xiaozi 
(ForeignerCN 2015). 
4.2 Distinction from and stratification in relation to other social groups
For me as an outsider it was initially very hard to distinguish when somebody 
was xiaozi, when somebody was not, and when xiaozi was perceived as a 
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positive or negative label. To understand it better, I began exploring more in 
detail what it is that distinguishes people who live the xiaozi lifestyle from 
others, what their social code is - who the xiaozi are and how they attempt to 
communicate their social distinction to each other and others. One of the most 
important findings was how xiaozi youth struggles to set themselves apart from 
the elite and the middle-class by referring to their superior taste and manner of 
consuming, and by doing so defying the norm that one must live a middle-class 
life to have a high quality life, and be a high quality person. Eventually I 
understood that even though xiaozi identity is expressed by certain practices and 
fashions, such as coffee, fine arts and Western fashions, the most important 
notion of xiaozi was their imagined superior inner state which was reflected in 
their 'better manners' and higher level of being and consuming. Their deep 
concern for and strong belief in their superior style and taste was intriguing 
because, as Bourdieu (1984) reminds us, struggles over taste are never only 
about taste, but a struggle for distinction and social status. As pointed out by 
Fong (2007), the importance of recognition as a qualitative individual is 
extremely important in Chinese society because status also determines the 
individual's social worth. This statement is also supported by Yan who has 
argued that politics of identity is the main area for individual emancipation in 
contemporary China. Below I exemplify this by describing how two of my 
informants distinguished xiaozi people from other classes in society and tried to 
assert xiaozi as the most qualitative. 
One of my informants was the 24-year old Alicia, who is an aspiring xiaozi girl, 
although she admitted to this only after being coaxed by me. Alicia has grown 
up as a single child in downtown Shanghai with her parents, who both are 
teachers. She has a Master's degree in German, and is currently doing an 
internship at a German automotive joint venture firm in the city. Alicia visited 
Xintiandi at least two times a month, which she thought was "one of the coolest 
places here [in Shanghai]", but said that she actually preferred other more 
private places, like jazz bars and art cafés. When I asked if she considered 
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herself to be xiaozi she giggled and said "Well... sometimes!" Alicia said that 
xiaozi to her is: 
"... to have a good life quality, but people needn't spend too much money on it - to get in contact 
with more art and beautiful stuff. It needn't be very expensive but rather must have a feeling of art. 
Xiaozi people like to enjoy jazz music, classic music, symphonies..."
Alicia made a very clear distinction between the splurging and tasteless 
consumption habits of richer people, which she called tuhao (e.g. the Chinese 
nouveau riche), and the tasteful and more balanced consumption habits which 
distinguishes a xiaozi person. "They [tuhao] spend a lot of money but have no 
taste of art." Her descriptions of tuhao people often referred to their lack of 
corporeal intonation (habitus) to what is considered as xiaozi and "wenming" 
(civilized) despite their high socioeconomic status: "They might talk very loudly 
in public" or "They might use red shoes with green pants, just to show some 
brand, you know, that costs millions..." Alicia's perception of the term xiaozi thus 
was a positive one; it marks of those who have the good taste not to spend money 
on brands just because they are expensive, but on such things which truly "have a 
feeling of art". When I asked Alicia what she thought of xiaozi people's quality,  
she claimed that "most of xiaozi people are of high quality. And some tuhao isn't 
low quality." What she meant was that socioeconomic status and high quality as 
defined by society's norms does not necessarily correspond to a cultivated or 
sophisticated personhood, which is what defines being xiaozi. Still she withheld 
that xiaozi people often have high quality also in the normative sense. "They 
[xiaozi people] are often higher educated. They like to learn things, are maybe 
interested in skills which cannot earn money like history, linguistics, or have a 
band." Xiaozi people's quality, according to Alicia, thus lies in their more genuine 
appreciation of art and knowledge, in contrast to the richer classes' aspirational 
consumption of such things to assert their own social superiority.
Another aspirational xiaozi girl was Lan, the 25-year old girl who first 
introduced me to the concept xiaozi. Lan has grown up as an singleton in the 
suburbs of Shanghai with her parents, who are shopkeepers. She attained high 
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scores at the Chinese university entrance exams (gaokao) and managed to enter 
the prestigious Fudan University, where she is currently doing a research 
internship. Lan often visited Xintiandi - we met there three times during March -
despite that it is located 30 minutes away with the metro from her home. She 
often came to Xintiandi to hang out with her female friends, drink coffee and 
look at the fashion, and said that sometimes she came there "just to feel the 
feeling" of the place, which she thought was "just right". Lan explained that her 
idea of being xiaozi was to live a lifestyle which consumption also entails
intellectual cultivation, or "spiritual", as she described it, compared to rich 
people who do not share the xiaozi's good taste in consumption. "Capitalists,
they only care for money, and they spend a very luxurious life - so small 
capitalism [xiaozi] is like not very luxurious but people will still enjoy their 
living... you must be very careful not to spend too much money. (...) [Xiaozi is] 
not only enjoying money but also a kind of spiritual life - to also care about the 
spiritual life - a cultural life. Can you feel what I say? We do not only care about 
the living, but also about the spirit life."
As pointed out by Davis, class culture is as much defined by cultures of 
consumption as cultures of production (Davis 2000), and consumption functions 
as a means to draw boundaries between one's own identity vis-a-vis other social 
groups and reinforce social labels. This was evident by my informants' severe 
efforts to separate their own tasteful and innate consumption of art, film, books 
and travel from the richer classes' distasteful and pretentious consumption of 
luxury items and tourism, a hierarchy which they meant reflected their own 
superior inner mental state. My informants openly and readily argued that they 
were superior to other people, and seemed to be very acceptable of and even 
promotional of stratifying people and determining their social worth according 
to their 'quality'. They often spoke derogatory of the vulgarity of the rich and the 
disgust they felt for the poor. Simultaneously their acceptance of distinction and 
stratification according to individual quality was coupled with their belief that 
they were of intrinsic possession of high quality due to their better taste and 
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knowledge of foreign culture. One of my informants, the 26-year old graphic 
designer Christopher, argued that 
- "They [xiaozi] have higher suzhi (quality). I think you're born with taste. Like some people are 
just born without taste and even though they become middle-class or rich they never get taste." 
- "Are they tuhao [nouveau riche]?"
- "Yeah. Even though they have the money I wouldn't say they are the same level as xiaozi."
Expressions of being 'on another level' and living a more 'spiritual life' 
constantly came through in my informants attempts of defining what sets xiaozi 
apart from the rest of Chinese society. Such spirituality they meant could be 
perceived in their genuine appreciation of art, but was mostly expressed through 
a knowledge of how to appropriate foreign cultural practices in a tasteful way; to 
be able to discuss Alexander McQueen's fashion, know French wine, and 
knowing how to be drinking café Americano. The core of the xiaozi's mentality 
seemed to be a strong belief that they are more sophisticated and thus have a 
higher social value than other Chinese citizens, coupled with a desire to distance 
themselves from those others - both poor and rich - to assert their superiority. 
Simultaneously the imagined 'level' which has to be attained in order to be 
xiaozi was constantly defined in comparison with other cultures - most notably 
the Taiwainese, Japanese and South Koreans, but also Americans and Europeans. 
The notion that Chinese people are 'on their way' and 'catching up' on other 
cultures and societies permeated the discourse on social stratification and how 
my xiaozi informants related their own distinctiveness from the rest of Chinese 
society to their more equal level of other populations. In an attempt to give a 
historical explanation to China's cultural shortcomings and xiaozi people's place 
in that context Christopher argued: 
"We're more like the new generation... I think maybe in 10-20 years many people will be like 
that... have manners, be more civilized. That is what I feel now, that still China is not that 
civilized, have that much civilized people. (...) Because the reason for that is that in the 1980s - no, 
I think in the 1970s or 1960s - they killed all those people who had that knowledge, in the Cultural 
Revolution. So those people were the ones who had all the knowledge, the higher education,  but 
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those were the one's who got caught. By those who had  no knowledge, no education at all. So this 
period will be the generation that were my grandparents, who got killed. So that's why my parents 
generation would not get any good education. And now my generation is slowly catching up. 
Actually that's why Taiwan kept better manners and better things from original China, because 
they didn't go through that. You can feel the Taiwainese are different than from Chinese - also 
because they are closer to Japan. I like Japanese culture. I think they are a little over-mannered, a 
little over-polite. (...) But they are supposed to be the Asian culture thing. So China is still in the 
period of still looking for something different on their own."
4.3 Café culture
To go to a café in Xintiandi with friends might seem like the most normal thing 
to do in an afternoon for a Westerner. But for Chinese youth, it is a relatively 
new way of socializing, and not something which everybody takes for granted or 
engage in doing but is considered as a very xiaozi thing to do both due to its 
economic cost and its cultural symbolic. As Lu points out, in Arabian countries 
and in Europe, and in particular in bigger cities such as London, coffee houses 
have for long been the most common place for socializing, even to the extent that 
it has been identified as the main locus of emergence of bourgeois public space 
and bourgeois culture (Lu 2002:176; Pincus 1995). But in China coffee houses 
have never been part of the native culture - the establishment of coffeehouses in 
Shanghai by foreigners in their concessions the 1920s and 30s were something 
which deviated from the local practice of tea drinking, which when served in 
public was a much more ritualized social gathering and did not enable the kind of 
casual sociality which the coffee houses offered. Subsequently, the coffee houses 
disappeared with the foreigners in Shanghai during the Maoist era (between 1949 
and 1970 the number of foreigners living in Shanghai decreased from several 
thousands to only 70 registered individuals in total (Farrer 2010:1215). Lu argues 
that coffee houses were never a popular resort for the Chinese, except a minority 
of 'foreign Mandarins' who were particularly pro-Western. Therefore the 
resurgence of coffee culture in post-reformist Shanghai is a sign of cultural 
significance, and places such as Xintiandi are examples of cultural change in 
public life and consumption preferences (Lu 2002:175). As a matter of fact, 
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Xintiandi offers a type of social activity which is not common in Chinese cities, 
and still is new (in an old way) in Shanghai; sidewalk cafés with outdoors seating, 
which faces each other on each sides of a square like an Italian piazza, where 
people can sit and gaze at each other while enjoying a drink in the sunshine. Prior 
to Xintiandi's construction some critical investors argued that it was a bad idea to 
build sidewalk cafés in Xintiandi since "no Chinese person will sit outside" (Liu-
Lin 2004:97). My 29-years old informant Ann, who works as an English teacher 
and has lived her whole life in Shanghai, said that going to cafés was something 
that had not been common during her youth, but had become more popular with 
the 1990s generation. "It's popular nowadays, especially among the young girls, to 
go to some café, have some high tea and take some selfies, you know? 'See, I'm 
having an afternoon tea with my friend! I take a picture!' They think that is to 
relax, how to enjoy their life." 
Notably, one of the most frequently referred features of xiaozi culture by my 
xiaozi informants was coffee drinking. They were all intrigued by my opinion on 
coffee drinking and often wanted to turn the conversation around, to make me and 
my coffee drinking habits the object of investigation. They asked me questions 
such as if I consider Starbucks a "high quality place"; why I drink espresso despite 
its being so little coffee for so much money; if I think it considered childish to put 
milk in coffee; and if I genuinely actually enjoy to drink black coffee. All of the 
questions were aimed at understanding the social practices and norms surrounding 
coffee drinking from what they considered to be my 'insider' perspective on the 
matter; as put by my informant Andy: "I think if we want real coffee we should 
drink it the real [Western] way." However, none of my informants were very keen 
on coffee which they often thought tasted bitter, but they all wanted to enjoy it, as 
it was one of the most xiaozi things that one could do. Not only, perhaps not at all, 
the drinking of coffee but the cosmopolitan knowledge of café culture was that
which a well-mannered and enlightened xiaozi person should master. But my 
informant Ann well described the anxiety which comes with cultivating the tastes 
of a xiaozi habitus and how coffee-drinking is an example of this process: 
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"If we are doing that [pointing to her café latte] that is xiaozi. Xiaozi is like zibenjia [capitalist]. 
That is the capitalist. Because in China, there has been no capitalist. But people from the West, 
they are capitalist, right? So people in China imitate them. They think that they are high level, we 
need to learn from them. So they drink coffee, they do things like that, you know, so we do that the 
same, then we call that xiaozi. If you are living a xiaozi life, it means that's the high quality. But 
for me, I have a different idea of that. Because some people, they just pretend, you know? We call 
them zhuangbi [vulgar]. Just like: 'You are not that level. You are not that much about art, or that 
much about culture. You sit there and drink coffee like that, seems like you enjoy that: 'Oh, that 
coffee tastes good, smells good!' But actually you know nothing about coffee; what kind of coffee 
bean it is, the procedure of making this coffee, you don't know the differences between this coffee 
and that coffee - you know nothing. So he or she will just pretend: 'This is the best coffee I have 
ever had..!' - you sit here in Xintiandi and maybe, people provide the same coffee at another place 
but then you will say ' I don't like that coffee, I drink the better coffee in Xintiandi.' (...) Good or 
bad, that shows that Chinese people are developing. We are just on the way to developing. So that 
kind of things will come out, you know. But for Chinese people it is a lot about face or pretend. 
Because Chinese people like 'face'! We are just on the way. So Chinese imitate the Korean, the 
Japanese, imitate American, or people from Europe. It's a good thing, because we are on the way 
of developing. But also because actually people are not on that level, they just pretend." 
The quote above reveals the imperatives towards appropriating a proper model 
of sophisticated culture and turning it into an index of xiaozi culture - to be able 
to assert oneself as more cosmopolitan and cultivated, but also running the risk 
of being condemned as pretentious and imitating. The term zhuangbi, which 
translates into 'vulgar' and 'pretentious', entails the ambiguity and scrutiny with 
which xiaozi is identified and acknowledged among young Chinese people. 
Contestations of whether xiaozi culture truly expresses cosmopolitanism and 
taste and a 'higher level' of being, or if it is imitation, pretention and fake was 
frequently discussed among my informants, and revealed the ambiguous feelings 
which they all had towards foreign culture and consumption and the risk of 
coming across as wrong, e.g. outside the boundaries of what is 'right' both in 
transnational settings and in the domestic Chinese. For example, Alicia told me 
while giggling how one Chinese girl she knew had chosen Lady Gaga as her 
English name, something which she thought was a sign of lack of cultural fine-
tuning in her attempt to establish an English identity, and "not very xiaozi". 
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4.4 Cultivating a xiaozi lifestyle
Because of their desire to distinguish themselves from the rest of society, the 
relationship to other social groups, in particular the richer middle-class, was 
crucial to my informants. Christopher expressed that he often felt frustration of 
being associated with nouveau riche Chinese in cosmopolitan settings and his 
desire to show his difference from them: 
"When Chinese people go overseas, making travel outside of China, they don't know how to 
queue, they have no manners, they speak so loud, they do so weird things, like in other countries. 
Actually two years ago when I was in Bali, I went to a restaurant and during dinner they have a 
show, right? So at the table downstairs in front of the stage, they were speaking Chinese. When 
we're eating and they are acting, they are the only people who stand up and take pictures. So I was 
like, are you kidding me? Don't you know that you are going to hide everyone's view? No one can 
see anymore. And that's why I posted something on my Weibo, that the government should really 
publish or do something about it. I called it a manner test. Before they are going they should have 
the quality test. So before they go abroad they have to go to a special course and study it and take 
the test, and once they fail they should not get a passport or they should not pass through the 
costumes or whatever. So that's what I'm saying - if you don't want to lose face, do not go outside 
and do like that because you do not present yourself, you present the whole China. Or when you 
do something wrong you can say "I'm sorry!" (...) I think I feel embarrassed to be Chinese when I 
go outside and then those people do this kind of stuff. I feel like 'No, I'm not like them, but 
different.' They are the people who have the money, but they are not xiaozi. Xiaozi is not just 
about money. It's about their education. Their manners, their quality. (...) That's the new money 
people [tuhao]. They have got rich outside but they have not got rich inside."
Thus it is rather a well-mannered and cultivated habitus than an extravagant 
Westernized lifestyle that xiaozi people themselves think defines them as beings
on a different level apart from other Chinese, similar to Weenink's definition of 
cosmopolitanism as a set of "bodily and mental predispositions and competencies 
(savoir faire) which help to engage confidently in such [transnational activities]" 
(Weenink 2008:1092). The boundary which the xiaozi draw between the xiaozi 
and the middle-class is thus the distinction between moderation/excess and 
sophistication/vulgarity. But to develop such bodily and mental predispositions 
(habitus) and competencies (cultural knowledge, or "taste" as savoir faire 
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translates into), as  "xiaozi people need to fill themselves up with knowledge" as 
my informant Andy expressed it, takes time and training and consistent 
encounters, which my informants did not really want to admit to but all readily 
engaged in. In discussions on hipster culture they were very sensitive to my point 
of view and were ready to change their own perception easily; they inquired my 
opinion on their coffee-drinking and English accents. Christopher even admitted 
that he had trained on changing his accent and learned to speak British English to 
"blend in better" in transnational settings with his international friends: "I even 
tried to train to change my accent as well. Like: 'Such a nice day today, isn't it? [in 
aristocratic British accent] Hahaha!" 
Lu has suggested that especially, but not only, the younger generation 
Shanghainese who has few or none memories of Maoist Shanghai and none of 
colonial Shanghai, has popularized Western aesthetics and references in the 1990s 
and 2000s (Lu 2002:177). One example of such Western-fetischized popular 
culture can be found in the foreword of the immensely popular semi-biographical 
youth book "Shanghai Baobei" (Shanghai Baby) (2000) in which the young writer 
Wei Hui made use of European references to strike a romantic and cosmopolitan 
tone - a sentimentality which permeates the book and obviously elicited a 
profound response among her many young readers:
Just as I typed the last word on my computer, the phone rang. It was a long-distance call from 
across the sea. For quite a while I could not respond to the "HELLO"[sic] that came from the other 
end of the line, for my mood was unstable and I was in a trance at the moment. Outside the 
window, the sunlight was growing faint. Over the windows of my old French-style home climbed 
ivies. Upstairs a child was playing the piano - Für Elise. Eventually, I threw the remains of the 
cigarette in my hand into ashtray and started to talk over the phone, in German, "I love you." (Wei
2000:1).
Xintiandi's iconography is another sign of this cosmopolitan trend, and in my 
interviews I inquired about my informants feelings and thoughts about the 
European references which Xintiandi displays. Only two of my informants made 
references to 'Old Shanghai' and used it to explain their experience of the place; 
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the most frequent answers were that the place seemed either multicultural, or 
'Shanghainese' to them - an identity which they also explained as multicultural. 
They all readily made references to the many non-Chinese elements of the place, 
but they also argued that such a hybridity foremost expressed the Shanghainese. 
The preserved shikumen houses were actually referred to by all as Western, and 
not preserving an old architecture but rather expresses something new - the global 
Shanghai. Lan, who said that she liked to come to Xintiandi because it reminded 
her of her visit to Rome, openly contested my inquiries about the categories 
foreign/Chinese by questioning: "What is foreign anyhow?" This rhetorical 
question can be explained by the statement of  Alicia who said that "It is very 
trendy now among young people to be interested in the foreign." 
None noted on Xintiandi's selective historicism or reported any negative 
sentiments regarding its celebration of colonial times - rather the opposite, one of 
my informants said that it reminded her of what she imagined as Shanghais' 
golden days, and that she liked to come there to get the feeling for the good taste 
that she thought that old Shanghainese culture had - for example the Western-style 
inspired Cheongsam dresses which Shanghainese women worn in the 1930s, 
which have become fashionable again (Lu 2002:171) and which are on sale in 
new design by the Chinese elite brand Shanghai Tang in Xintiandi. The references 
to European elite culture rather seemed to spur positive emotions of opportunity 
and desire to incorporate it into an accessible Shanghainese xiaozi identity. One of 
my male informants said that Xintiandi simultaneously reminded him of one of 
China's four classic novels, A Dream in Red Mansions, and his favorite television 
series, the British BBC production Downton Abbey. He explained that both
stories revolve around elite families living in the 19th century, during the Qing 
Dynasty and the Commonwealth of Britain, both include a broad set of characters 
with various personalities and backgrounds, and both give detailed insights in the 
daily lives of the elite in feudal China and United Kingdom respectively. By using 
reading as a means for cultural exploration, he was able to compare the two 
stories in order to genuinely understand differences and similarities in Chinese 
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and Western elite culture, to overcome cultural boundaries and explore what he 
really thought to be of high quality. 
The strong association between 'art' and xiaozi culture was often expressed in 
the association between an artsy and international xiaozi lifestyle and its 
reflection in Xintiandi's aesthetic features (hybrid architecture, jazzy soundscape, 
international fashion) and commercial foreign experiences (such as coffee-
drinking, high tea, hanging out in sidewalk cafés, and the Fashion Week). This 
was affirmed by people's description of Xintiandi as "a xiaozi place" and that "a 
lot of the people in Xintiandi are xiaozi." Ann defined Xintiandi as an "art 
atmosphere area" and Alicia as "one of the coolest places here [in Shanghai]" 
together with the Bund (the waterfront area along the Huangpu River; a colonial 
construction, and today a famous nightlife and art gallery location). Ann argued 
that "This is the first fashionable place here, in Shanghai I mean. Foreigners, the 
young, people who wanna catch the fashion, they come here. But now, more and 
more places are coming here in Shanghai where people can do that." In the 
macro-process of place-making in Shanghai (of becoming a global city) 
'modernization' is made place by place, and the cityscape is unevenly developed 
(Li & Wu 2006; Zhang 2005; Vaide 2015:27). In my informants' minds, 
Xintiandi was considered one of the places in the city which lives up to 
international standard, and as such also offers internationally useful cultural 
know-how and artifacts. Alicia, who mainly interpreted Xintiandi as a French 
place because of its "romantic and delicate lifestyle" said that "the things sold in 
Xintiandi are xiaozi, and can improve the living of people. Like essential oils, or 
high tea." [high tea = a cultural practice which historically stems from British 
afternoon tea culture, but which in Xintiandi blends in as one of many European 
cultural experiences]. One of my male informants, the 24 years old engineer 
graduate Andy, said: "If I come to Xintiandi, I can refresh many sources of my 
life; the way people are dressing... what's new, what they [foreigners] bring with 
them... like using shorts...! Like that. (...) It is a great place to get close to the 
foreign ways." Thus, Xintiandi is perceived as a place which offers a 
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cosmopolitan setting where foreigners lifestyle can be explored and objects 
associated to that lifestyle can be bought. 
4.5 The importance of cultural capital to lower middle-class individuals
While it might seem like xiaozi culture only is an expression of the reach of 
global consumer culture, it would be misleading to assume that it is simply the
Westernized features that set xiaozi apart from the rest of society. As my 
informants explained to me, a person who attempts to be xiaozi but overdoes it 
might be labeled tuhao - a vulgar consumerist who tries to assert his sophistication
through objectified Western cultural capital, without showing the tastefulness of 
one who knows how to behave in a transnational environment. This sensitivity to 
associations with mainstream society and its culture of consumption is a tendency 
which Mark Greif also has identified among lower middle-class American 
hipsters. Greif's research shows that American hipsters mainly come from two 
distinct socioeconomic groups; white rich youth who want to prove their own 
innate sense of style beyond wealth, whose lifestyle is being supported by their 
wealthy parents; and white lower middle-class youth who also want to prove their 
innate sophistication despite not having any family wealth or social position to 
prove it through. Greif suggests that style is so important and so sensitive for 
lower middle-class youth because they have so little other social and cultural 
capital to draw upon in their attempts to move up in society; "the most socially 
precarious - the lower-middle-class young, moving up through style, but with no 
backstop of parental culture or family capital." (Greif 2010). As a result, cultural 
capital through style becomes particularly precious, whether it is through anti-
commercial style (American hipsters) or foreign consumer-style (Shanghainese 
xiaozi). When I asked Christopher about why it is so important for xiaozi people 
to drink coffee, he replied:
"It's not just about drinking coffee. Anyone can drink coffee - even the beggar in the street can do 
that. Being xiaozi has to be that their mind has to be a different level, not just be an ordinary guy, 
it has to be something higher. I would say you have to have some taste, and you also have to be of 
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a level of not the typical Chinese. That is actually related to each other. Once you're xiaozi it 
means that you have better education, that you have international friends, it means you have better 
manners - so you wouldn't be spitting on the street anymore, and also you be very polite, and you 
know how to... like let's say that you go to McDonald's, you would clean your own dish - you 
know how to react like people who have manners. That's not really about being international, it's 
about education. From your family. (...) or, I'm not sure actually. Their parents can give them some 
better education - like manners, you get that from your parents. So then you can be xiaozi earlier. 
But also you can learn it from somewhere else, like friends.  Because when you're xiaozi you also 
have to hang out with other people who are xiaozi, you wouldn't hang out with people who are..."
"Lower?"
"Yeah."
The quote above once again points to how the perception of the xiaoizi's "taste" 
which is "of a level of not the typical Chinese" is used as an argument to 
establish their higher quality and promote their higher social status in society. It 
also reveals the important social mobility aspect of the xiaozi lifestyle - that it is 
a ticket to new social circles, and explains how to adopt such a lifestyle can 
become a way to jockey for a higher social position despite one's original lower 
social origin. As Christopher pointed out, despite that one's parents may not 
have the cultural or economic capital to provide them with the style of a high 
quality individual, it is also possible to acquire such cultural capital (style, 
manners, taste, know-how) by hanging out with other people who do - by 
"getting close to the foreign ways", as Andy put it. While the xiaozi lifestyle 
mostly seemed to be a way for my informants to assert and maintain the higher 
social position which they had achieved to reach by other institutionalized 
means, such as university education or professional occupation, it sometimes 
also functioned as a direct vehicle for upward social mobility. For example 
Alicia told me that her interest in and pursuit of a Europe-oriented education and 
knowledge of European culture and language had helped her to land the 
internship which she was currently doing at a German joint venture firm in 
Shanghai. My informant Jelena, who had a migrant background, had met her 
German boyfriend one night at Yongkang Road, a party street with bars run by 
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foreigners and one of the most popular places in the city for foreign expatriates 
to hang out. This was also the place where I met Christopher, as he started to 
talk to me in the line to the bar one night out. All my informants readily went to 
places such as Yonkang Road and Xintiandi, to meet their xiaozi friends, go 
shopping, have coffee, or party with foreigners. Thus, these sort of social 
activities which xiaozi youth embark upon do not only have a cultural symbolic 
which helps them to form an identity which confirms their self-perceived 
superiority, but it also opens up new possibilities for them to convert that 
cultural capital into social capital as they can meet international friends or 
boy/girlfriends, to make up for the fact that they do not have much economic 
capital nor social connections in Chinese society. The xiaozi lifestyle thus also 
functions as a strategic practice to attain upward social mobility, with various 
individual success.
4.6 Questioning the middle-class imperative 
While the foreign consumption habits are objectified expressions of my 
informants desire to distinguish and distance themselves from other social 
groups in society, it seemed to be grounded in a discontent with Chinese culture 
and its social norms, and the high costs, both financially, emotionally and 
mentally of establishing a high quality middle-class life. They often referred to 
the immense pressure from parents and society to conform to the middle-class 
norm, something which they thought was a negative trait inherent to Chinese 
culture. The pressure from parents to establish a middle-class life and their own 
ambiguity towards establishing such a lifestyle was constantly battering their 
minds. Their parents desire for them to buy property and marry was the most 
constant conflict which they referred to. According to my informants, property 
investment in China is not a conjugal affair - it is a transaction which involves 
both families of the married couple and especially the man's family is expected 
to pay a majority of the costs, whether in cash or in interests on loans. Thus to 
my informants to buy property did not mean to buy their own house, but to tie 
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themselves economically tighter to their parents through the common investment. 
This was particularly pressing since such an investment would be a large 
expense and long-term investment in family economy and thus, social relations. 
Jelena said; "Why would I want that, for my parents to buy me a house? To tie 
me up for the rest of my future?" 
On the other end, the xiaozi's preference for foreign things seemed to be of little 
interest of their parents. Andy said that his parents cared little about his lifestyle 
apart from the question when he was going to marry, which he thought was silly; 
"First I want to explore more new things. You know the Land Rover commercial
which says that some are born with a discovery gene? Yeah. I think I have that, 
like a discovery gene. I want to discover more, see more." As a matter of fact, 
none of my informants mentioned any concern from their parents about their 
foreign consumption habits, but rather their unwillingness to cope with the 
middle-class norm; what Ann described as "to make money to buy house to get 
married!" This circle, money, property and marriage, seemed to collide with their 
own wish to "try many different things" and "explore what they want".
Christopher said:
"If they get married, their parents are probably gonna force them to become middle-class, and then 
they have to buy an apartment. But among the new generation, if their parents are really open-
minded then they will not force them to buy an apartment. And then they do not have to pay for 
that, to become middle-class."
Likewise, Ann claimed that because of the enormous costs of marriage and 
property in the bigger Chinese cities the quest of finding a partner today had 
become a quest for finding a partner you could afford to marry, not someone you 
love. 
"... the way they grew up didn't provide this environment to allow them to be what they are. So 
that's why they want to express themselves again, to do something like they want to be, to do. (...) 
[Xiaozi] want to express themselves now when they can, because before those people cannot 
afford it, or their parents wouldn't let them do it. (...) But I think it's going to be hard for them to do 
that. Because the big environment is like, that you have to do this, do that. The pressure from the 
parents is not... You know that China is very family-oriented place? So unless you want to cut off 
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everything from your family, or if you're not the only child, then some pressure is taken off from 
your shoulders. If you are the only child, they probably expect more. But also if you are the only 
child, your parents can provide you more. So you don't really have that much pressure." 
One of the most intriguing cases was my 23-year old informant Jelena. Jelena 
originally comes from a poor background in Anhui but managed to enter 
university in Shanghai, and works as a real-estate broker on the side of her 
studies. Despite a humble background Jelena does not live on the brink of 
poverty. She and her German boyfriend went on three trips abroad during the four 
months which we were in contact, she had her own brand-new scooter, and often 
posted pictures on Wechat of herself and her girlfriends in classy bars in 
Shanghai. But she fiercely detested the splurging lifestyle of richer people than 
herself, and openly defined herself as xiaozi. "... I'm not like one of those 90s 
Chinese girls (...) they will go shopping and eat and travel like idiots because they 
have no idea how hard it is to make money. Because I am still young so even I 
have that much money I would save for travel or investment for my future. 
Anyway I spend money on the things I like, for example I would pay a lot for nice 
clothes, but not the famous brands but something seriously worth and nice." By 
depicting richer girls' shopping for expensive brands and social status in negative 
terms, and describing her own "xiaozi" habits as based in a profound aesthetic 
appreciation and self-conscious choice, Jelena seemed to gain a sense of 
superiority towards those with more social and economic power than herself. She 
told me that she had said no to her parents offer to buy her and her boyfriend a 
house, because they were saving to move abroad and travel. She particularly 
emphasized her preference for spending her money on travel and what she viewed 
as aesthetically fulfilling experiences, rather than to try to establish a Chinese 
middle-class life with house and car in a suburb, which she claimed was the 
dream of most Shanghainese girls. 
Indeed, Jelena seems to correspond well to how xiaozi are characterized by 
Laughlin in China Daily: "In a society where memories of scarcity are none too 
distant, xiaozi live for the present. Many Chinese people see home ownership as 
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the mark of an eligible bachelor, but xiaozi regard such notions with disdain. As 
real estate prices skyrocket, they prefer to rent and spend any extra cash on 
escapes to Yunnan province or foreign-language novels and DVDs." (Laughlin 
2012). Jelena was very aware of her financial limitations and had made it very 
clear to her parents that she wanted to have no part in bank loans and tying herself
to her family for the rest of her life; she and her boyfriend were going to use all 
their savings to leave China, travel and live a more casual, but "happy" life. She 
said: "I think you guys [foreigners] know how to enjoy the life, really. (...)." Such
an image of the individually emancipated, carefree and cool foreigner was an
imagination which Jelena shared with almost all of my informants and which they 
often referred to in their descriptions of their desires of how to be and live. They 
envied the individual freedom which they thought Western youth has to explore 
their own preferences and steer the course of their life in the direction they want, 
and in contrast they accused Chinese culture and society for not allowing them 
such individual expression. Their idealization of the foreigner as the carefree, cool 
and emancipated individual shaped their own desire and strive for a more 
individually fulfilling life, and inspired their vision of what constitutes the ideal 
person of highest quality.  
4.7 The role of the foreigner in xiaozi youth's minds
The idealized imagination of the foreigner was an important source of 
inspiration for my informants in two senses; it seemed to spur their desire of 
greater individual emancipation; and the lifestyle of foreigners in Shanghai also 
seemed to challenge the norms of how to enjoy life (e.g. different cultures of 
consumption) which they had conceived from their Chinese upbringing. The 
majority of my informants were convinced that foreigners are better at enjoying 
life; that their lifestyle per se is very xiaozi, or relaxed and enjoyable, and the 
way that they take on life is better for achieving personal development and 
personal happiness, with more time and space for self-exploration and trying out 
different lifestyles and identities. This was as a personal trait which was 
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beneficial to cultivate because, as one of my informants echoed the words of the 
Quality for Education campaign, it makes one more "all-round" and "we know 
more about the world, we can communicate with much more people with all-
round knowledge". One of my female informants, 27-year old Iannis, who has 
an American boyfriend since about a year ago, explained how their different 
attitudes towards leisure played out in their relationship and how she traced that 
back to their different cultural origins: 
"Chinese are not that relaxed, you know. We think too much some times. We cannot enjoy our 
life. We think like: 'Oh, I need to get up early in the next morning, so I don't wanna hang out 
tonight.' Or 'I need to do this later in the day, so I cannot do this now.' We do this way too much. 
But that's what I learned from Patrick [her American boyfriend], he taught me how to. He said 'It's 
fine. Do something, just once, just to relax. Enjoy your life..! Not that we should do that every 
night, you know, hang out late every night, but sometimes you CAN do that, just enjoy! For 
Chinese people we always think too much. (...) And I need to change. We are always arguing 
about that, because he wants to hang out every night and drink you know, that is the only problem 
with him. But we need to balance that, and chill at home sometimes. (...) I always used to think 'It's 
not good for you to hang out' and 'It's not good for me to hang out' but now, I've changed my idea 
of that: 'Hm, why not?' You know once, or twice, it's fine. We need to do that, to make myself 
happy..! That's because of the culture and the education in China; because the parents always tell
you, 'You cannot do this!', 'You cannot do that!', that's the way of Chinese education - but 
sometimes, you can! You know? You will find out different areas of your life, different fields and 
minds towards your life."
Andy made use of a geometric abstract metaphor to explain his understanding of 
Western and Chinese approaches to life and his desire for a more Western-
inspired lifestyle:
- "We realize now that foreigners have more sources of enjoying their life. (...) Foreigners are 
more causal. Chinese life is like a straight line, but foreigners life is more like a circle. They all 
reach the same place, but you do more different things. (...) We are growing, now we know 
more, and so we want more personal happiness."
- "And you think you should learn from foreign cultures about that..?"
- "Yes, yes; I think that is the main point."
52
The questioning of the middle-class life imperative in Chinese society - the will to 
challenge norms and establish a different life than their parents is a trait which 
xiaozi culture shares with modern youth cultures around the world. But can the 
xiaozi youth continue to pursue their different lifestyle and values in life as they 
grow older, or will they conform to their parents and societies expectations of 
achieving the highest quality middle-class life when they become adults? This 
question is yet to be answered. Christopher was skeptic but hopeful about such a 
societal change:
"I think xiaozi is like on the way to middle-class. It's reaching the point. But it also depends on 
themselves... if they want to continue to be xiaozi all the time, or if they want to get an apartment 
and pay like tons and tons of loans to the bank for the rest of their future."
4.7 Summary
In this chapter I have described the social definition of xiaozi in Shanghai as a 
group who 1) have enough money to spend on discretionary consumption but are 
not really rich, e.g. belong to the lower middle-class; and 2) feel a need to 
distinguish themselves from the rest of society due to their belief that their 
'quality' is superior to others, despite their limited economic and social capital
and humble origins. Therefore cultural capital, or taste and style, is incredibly 
important for xiaozi youth. They seek to express and maintain their social 
distinction by appropriating foreign legitimate cultural practices such as coffee-
drinking, cultivating British accents, listening to jazz music, drinking French 
wine, watching and learning from British entertainment culture, and seeking
inspiration from international fashion; by going to the places in Shanghai where 
foreigners go (ex. Xintiandi, Yongkang Road) and socializing only with other 
xiaozi people and foreigners. Xiaozi also put a lot of emphasis on the importance
of what they perceive as being the proper corporal intonation and civilized 
manners in international settings, as a proof of their sophistication. The cultural 
capital which xiaozi create through their lifestyle can also turn into social 
capital, if they meet foreign friends or partners, which sometimes serve as a 
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vehicle for upward social mobility. More often, the assertion of themselves as 
being of high quality despite their lower middle-income status functions as a self-
affirming mechanism to confirm their own superiority within the discourse on 
ideal personhood (quality). Lastly, I have described the sociopsychological issues 
which xiaozi youth grapple with, such as their discontent with Chinese cultural 
norms, education and parenting, and how this prompts them to question the 
middle-class aspirations which their parents have planned for them. They feel that 
such plans are overwhelming and very costly, leave too little room for their own
self-exploration and enjoyment, and therefore question their parents' and society's 
definition of middle-class as high quality and the most desirable life. 
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5. Discussion
In this chapter I discuss my findings related to the theory on social distinction, the 
mainstream discourse on quality and the individualization of Chinese society. I 
will argue that the xiaozi ideology is a reaction to the mainstream discourse on 
ideal personhood and middle-class attainment in China, promoted by young 
people who want to transcend local definitions of social stratification and have the 
financial capacity to use what they imagine as international and modern cultural 
practices to elevate and establish their status in the emerging globalizing Chinese 
society. I begin with analyzing xiaozi subculture through the lens of Bourdieu's 
theory on social distinction; how taste is misrecognized and promoted as cultural 
knowledge by xiaozi youth, and how the authenticity of such superiority is 
questioned by others to miscredit xiaozi youth as aspirational. Then I discuss how 
such power struggles reveal how social stratification in contemporary China is 
narrated along an imagined linear path towards a modern Chinese society, whose
population ultimately will be of the same standard as other modern nations. Lastly 
I discuss how the power struggles of xiaozi youth are situated within the larger 
process of the emancipation of the Chinese individual through state-directed 
modernization as they challenge traditional Chinese definitions of the ideal life.
5.1 Power struggles in the politics of recognition for social status
My most consistent findings in conversations with young Chinese people, both 
among those who defined themselves as xiaozi and those who did not, was the 
struggle for recognition as individuals of high quality. Similar to Fong's (2007) 
description of how her young Chinese informants reconstructed the quality 
discourse to favor their personal strengths, so did my informants try to subvert the 
quality concept by drawing boundaries between their own lifestyle and that of 
others to enable a favorable symbolic hierarchy. It was a struggle for social status
which reinvented itself with every informant, as every person slightly shifted the 
values in the discourse to reflect their own personality and lifestyle. It was by 
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observing this power struggle from within that I gained awareness of the politics 
of recognition for social status which the xiaozi youth are implicated with, and the 
difficulties and achievements for recognition which they experienced as they 
attempted to transcend the definitions for social stratification in the quality 
discourse by appropriating foreign cultural practices.
What was noteworthy was that all my xiaozi informants were youth who came 
from fairly humble backgrounds; their parents were teachers, shopkeepers and 
salesmen, with stable incomes but limited economic capital, and no or few social 
connections to the higher strata of society. But all had begun to achieve some 
upward social mobility - by entering a prestigious university, getting an internship 
at a foreign joint venture firm, or meeting a foreign partner. They were by no 
means on their way to enter the elite segment of Chinese society (such as the 
bohemian bourgeois in the big American cities) but possibly on the track to 
achieve the Chinese dream; a middle-class life with an university degree, a white-
collar job, an apartment and a white-collar partner, possibly even a foreigner. 
They were in a transitional position in society, and seemed to feel a need to prove 
their social worth. While drinking coffee at Starbucks obviously was not going to 
get them as far ahead in society as a degree from Fudan or Jiatong University, it 
seemed to be a way for them to mark and maintain the higher social status which 
they had achieved and which was very important to them. However, in some cases 
it evidently also had direct social mobility effects; for example for Jelena who met 
her German boyfriend by visiting the foreigners favorite hang-outs, and Alicia 
who had managed to land her internship at a German joint-venture firm because 
of her knowledge of European culture and language. The xiaozi lifestyle thus both 
functioned as a vehicle for upward social mobility in combination with other 
channels for mobility, and as a "social weapon" to mark and maintain the higher 
status which they had achieved to those who were still superior to them in status, 
e.g. the established middle-class and the rich. Because of their lesser economic 
and social capital, the cultural capital which their lifestyle could create for them 
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became even more important to assert themselves as people of 'authentic' high 
quality. 
While the cultural hybridity in Xintiandi as such didn't mean much to the xiaozi, 
which is what have concerned all previous scholars who have analyzed Xintiandi's 
hybridity and place-promotion (He 2007; He & Wu 2004; Lu 2002; Wai 2006; 
Xuefei 2008), it was more important for them to prove their ability to conduct 
themselves confidently in the multicultural and modern environment. This was 
observable in their sense of superiority and security as long as they believed that 
they interpreted the place and its foreign social practices properly by international 
cultural standards - like Lan who proudly made architectural references to Rome, 
or Christopher who described how to behave at McDonald's, and condemned 
those who did not know how to "react to the proper behavior". But likewise in
their anxious feelings about not understanding such social settings properly and 
about acting or doing wrong - for example by taking an English name that is 
considered vulgar, misunderstanding the meaning of the hipster concept, drinking 
their coffee in a way that is considered childish, or believing that Starbucks is a 
really cool, 'high quality' place if it is, in what they imagine as 'international' 
culture, as a matter of fact maybe not. As they struggled with these fine and 
highly subjective cultural interpretations, they were also concerned about being 
accused by fellow Chinese youth to be considered pretentious (zhuangbi) and 
imitating Western culture without knowing what they are doing, which they often 
accused other people of, directly or indirectly. This was particularly sensitive 
since vulgarity or tastelessness was not considered to be able to exist within the 
boundaries of the culturally aware and sensitive fine line of authenticity which 
xiaozi people draw around themselves in order to separate themselves from the 
richer middle-class and the poor. The constant references to the vulgar, the fake, 
and the risk of losing face both to degrade others social status but also to express 
one's own fear of trying to be more than one might actually be (both in terms of 
self-appreciation and others appreciation) displays an anxiety regarding how to be 
authentic xiaozi, which tainted their persuasive attitude.
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Such power struggles over definitions of authenticity is what comes by what 
Bourdieu calls the misrecognition of taste as an intellectual and innate ability, and 
not a judgment structured by Chinese society's cultural [symbolic] hierarchy. Thus 
this is not a social phenomena which is particular for the xiaozi; in his 
sociological inquiry of American hipsters Greif described similar patterns of 
fierce power struggles over cultural capital; "... the habits of hatred and accusation 
are endemic to hipsters because they feel the weakness of everyone’s position —
including their own. Proving that someone is trying desperately to boost himself 
instantly undoes him as an opponent. He’s a fake, while you are a natural 
aristocrat of taste." (Greif 2010). The fine line between 'authentic' and 'wannabe' 
and high and low quality is a boundary which is constantly being drawn and 
redrawn, which my informants also were aware of. Or more aptly put by 
Christopher; "If you have good taste you can make Alexander McQueen look like 
fashion, but if you have no taste you can also make it look like two kuai [the 
Chinese currency Renminbi] shit from the street." For a young adult who comes
from a lower middle-class background and is struggling to move up in society, the 
last thing you want to be associated with is two kuai shit from the street. You 
want to be associated with the sophistication of international fashion and gain the 
respect that European taste and manners has in Chinese society. But to attempt to 
establish oneself as trendy and cosmopolitan is also a risk if people think like 
Ann: "you are really not that much about art. You are really not at that level." This 
judgment, both from other Chinese but also from foreigners such as myself, made 
them uncertain in their assertion of themselves as worthy of a higher social status. 
These anxious feelings are very typical of class-journeys; the appropriation of 
new and foreign habits, tastes and manners and the acceptance or defiance of
change in lifestyle and social status by one's social surroundings (such as parents, 
friends and strangers) is a psychologically demanding and vulnerable process
which easily can become implicated with feelings of uncertainty and insecurity.
Their self-perceived 'cosmopolitanism' was obviously a sensitive topic; it was not 
uncommon that they became a little offended when I asked about their knowledge 
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of foreign cultures, or about the 'cosmopolitan' character of Shanghainese identity. 
In our conversations their attitude could be very changing - from being very 
persuasive and boasting about their cultural knowledge, to insecure questioning 
the very next moment. Their susceptibility to my opinions and habits showed how 
sensible and willing they are towards changing themselves to become what they 
thought was more authentic or 'real'. 
This also explained their mixed feelings towards adopting xiaozi as their social 
label, because of its associations to the pretentious and the effete, but 
simultaneously a sign of someone who has taste and some money. This awareness 
and questioning of the authenticity of the xiaozi lifestyle displays the power 
struggles for recognition and social status among the young Chinese, and reveals 
how it is implicated with other forms of social and economic capital. Only my 
richer informant pointed to the fact that the xiaozi lifestyle demands a certain 
level of family wealth, which inevitably also makes it a question of class. For 
example, Christopher pointed out that Chinese citizens must be able to prove that 
they have a minimum of 50,000 Renminbi (~$8057) in their bank account when 
they apply for travelling outside of China, which inevitably limits the possibilities 
for many Chinese to travel abroad. As the emphasis on the 'petit' (or xiao =  small, 
in xiaozi, small capitalist) part of their bourgeois lifestyle points to, it is evidently 
so that the xiaozi lifestyle is limited and enabled by its particular economic 
abilities. This, however, was never mentioned by the xiaozi themselves, who 
argued that it is their intrinsic good taste, cosmopolitanism and modern manners 
which differs them from the rich and the poor, whom were equally condemned as 
of lower quality due to their uncivilized and tasteless lifestyles and manners. 
Sometimes it was startling how they could talk very openly about how they had 
consciously changed themselves to appropriate foreign cultural practices and 
corporal manners and intonations, and how others had not had the good taste to do 
so, while simultaneously arguing that it was due to their intrinsic good taste.
Paradoxically the misrecognition of their own lifestyle choices as a result of taste
and not socially structured judgments, co-existed in their minds with an 
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assumption that they were part of a macro-change of Chinese society and that "in 
10 or 20 years most Chinese will be like this" and that "the Chinese are on their 
way" - along a linear path towards modernity in which they considered themselves 
as the avant-garde, or "the new generation Chinese."
5.2 Social stratification along the linear path towards modernity
Friedman has argued that "[t]he globalization of class structure is expressed at the 
elite level by an increasing self-consciousness of world position." (Friedman 
2000:653). Such self-consciousness was strikingly evident among my informants, 
who made constant references to China's position in the world and their 
subsequent position in it as Chinese subjects. It was striking to see the 
correspondence between the official rhetoric of the CPC about the need to elevate 
the quality of the Chinese population and the view among my informants on the 
Chinese population as "uneducated", "uncivilized", and even "disgusting", and its 
traditional culture as of "low quality". These statements were enabled by the 
comparison with other specific cultures; the Taiwainese, the Japanese, the South 
Korean, the American and the European. By way of this imaginary stratification 
along a global hierarchy they stated that the Chinese "has to develop", and "are on 
their way" and "are not yet on that level". These statements also imply that they 
imagine a point, or a telos [purposive goal] in the future when the Chinese 
population would have reached a level on par with, or superior to, other cultures 
with which they compared themselves to. This imaginary linear path towards what 
they perceive as modernity and its implications with the perception of foreign 
cultures explains how the concept of the foreign and modernity mixes in many 
Chinese minds - supporting Yan's argument that for many Chinese 'modern' 
actually means 'American' or 'the international' (Yan 2009:264). 
This conceptualization mirrors what Gabriel has described as "the modernist 
narrative along a linear path towards a telos" (Gabriel 2006:9). It might be 
constructive here to remind oneself of Habermas historical inquiry of how the 
concept of modernity itself implies a rupture and attempt to objectify change in 
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history, rather than it define a certain characteristic of the contemporary epoch. In 
his inquiry of the concept of modernity, Habermas uncovered how the Latin word
modernus has 'appeared and reappeared' in Europe ever since the late fifth century 
when structural societal transformation have taken place and the need has 
emerged to differentiate the new order relative to the earlier societal order, to 
establish a new epoch (Habermas 1987). Modernity thus is an abstract means to 
define change by objectifying time (for example, pre-/postmodern), something 
that also seems to permeate the thinking of both the CPC and the xiaozi; that they 
are producing "something new", "the new generation", the embodied beginning of 
China's modernization and thus, at the forefront of a desirable change that 
eventually will come to all Chinese subjects. The linguistic history of the use of 
the word, however, sheds light on the fluidity of the concept. The attributed 
meaning of modernity as understood today has been constituted by the 
characteristics of the societal transformation which the European Enlightenment 
brought with it: rationalism, [Western] science, and a pursuit of progress (Arce & 
Long 1999:4) but it has continuously been, and is being, dialectically engaged in 
the formation of other discourses such as colonialism, urbanism, liberalism, 
capitalism and cosmopolitanism (Vaide 2015:19), and in contemporary China, the 
general discourse on 'quality' or ideal personhood.
My informants vision of how China now also is set on the track on the road to 
'modernization' thus also implied many other meanings which they attribute to the 
contemporary concepts of 'modern nation' and 'modern human beings' as someone 
who differs from the previous, traditional and non-modern Chinese, which 
explained their desire to set themselves apart and maintain distinction from the 
poorer and backward sections of the emerging Chinese society. In their struggle 
against other richer social groups for social status in the new modern Chinese 
society, the style and manners of 'modernity' becomes their most viable weapon to 
establish a higher social status; the importance of being a person who eats at 
McDonald's and disposes of her or his own trash; knows not to call herself Lady 
Gaga in public; have the decency not to spit on the street; and drinks coffee 
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without milk at Starbucks, or maybe at the Italian trattoria - in short, a well-
mannered habitus which "knows how to react to the proper behavior".
Simultaneously, they often also expressed that the Chinese are "searching for their 
own way" or their own way of being modern, but that in the attempt of doing so 
they imitate other cultures which they perceive as proper modern. This fine 
balance act of cultural production of Chinese modernity is especially precarious 
for xiaozi youth since they are so dependent  on their cultural capital in 
comparison to their richer peers, and explains the anxiety with which they 
appropriate foreign cultural practices. The xiaozi badly wanted to establish their 
own sophistication as something which was intrinsic and unique for them, 
something they were born with, similar to how richer classes assert themselves as 
a distinct breed worthy of power and respect. Although the xiaozi's assertion of 
their social worth was blended with visible uncertainty, the 'born with taste'-
arguments was an attempt at making their cultural capital inaccessible to other 
groups, richer and poorer, and safeguarding the social status which their lifestyle 
could bring them. 
The fact that my informants stratified themselves along a transnational scale and 
linear path towards modernity also explains how the xiaozi could jockey for a
position as the highest quality people of all in Chinese society, despite their 
limited local social and economic power. Along the imagined linear path towards 
modernity they perceived themselves as the one's who have come the furthest, the 
one's who are "catching up" (one of my informants' favorite terms) on the outside 
world the fastest, even faster than the richer classes. The way by which such 
transnational comparison permeates the local discourse on quality proves the 
value (cultural capital) that is vested in the attributed meanings of foreign and 
modern taste and manners among Chinese young. The xiaozi's appropriation of 
foreign cultural practices motivated by their attribution to it as modern and 
civilized, well exemplifies how cultural production takes place in the global 
system (Friedman 2000:645) dependent upon the experienced subjective 
attribution of meaning which individuals appropriate as their own and maintain -
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and why other cultural meanings are not maintained, such as traditional Chinese 
cultural practices. The choice of the foreign coffee over the native tea might seem 
like a question of taste, but as my informants desire to drink coffee despite their 
lack of fondness of it showed, it is a type of behavior which is connected to a 
symbolic hierarchy where the transnational is positioned above the local. Such
symbolic hierarchy explains why and how the xiaozi, positioned in the middle of 
the domestic Chinese societal hierarchy, attempts to capitalize on the regional 
globalization of Chinese society by adopting particular foreign and modern 
cultural practices which they perceive as a legitimate form of cultural capital (for 
example, to drink coffee and listen to jazz music, not to do Bollywood dancing or 
dress like manga figures), to socially and mentally elevate themselves. However, 
their opportunities for social mobility by such a lifestyle are limited and must be 
combined with other empowering sources, and should be understood as a coping 
strategy to the fact that they lack the economic capital and social connections to 
reach the higher echelons of Chinese society. 
5.3 Individualization and social mobility
The anthropologist Tanya Luhrmann has argued that identities, beliefs, and 
experiences are mutually constitutive (1989), and to understand the formation of 
my informants beliefs and xiaozi identity, I took my point of departure in their 
descriptions of their experiences of and feelings towards Chinese society and the 
norm which governs it, namely that of middle-class attainment (which equals the 
highest quality attainment). The most frequently cited reasons given by my 
informants for why they wanted to escape the mainstream norms of middle-class 
attainment was based on their straining experiences from the Chinese education 
system, the high expectations from their parents as the only child, their limited 
opportunities for attainment of a middle-class life and the immense burden which 
embarking upon such a road implied. Simultaneously they frequently expressed 
their desire for a qualitative life of their own where they could explore more of 
their own desires and characteristics which they saw among the Westerners which 
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they met. Equally important for them seemed to be the practical question of 
finances; the overwhelming cost of establishing a middle-class life in Shanghai 
seemed to be one of the major reasons for why they had doubts about and rejected
the worth of attempting at such a lifestyle. They questioned the parental 
expectations in line with tradition that the spouse must provide the bride with a 
home as they marry; this practice was disregarded by all the girls who said that 
they rather wanted to live with someone they love than someone who can buy 
them a house. Their belief that their own xiaozi lifestyle was better because of its 
innate and emotionally fulfilling foundation, and their disdain for people who 
wanted the middle-class life merely because of its social status, thus were beliefs 
which were mutually constitutive and confirmed their perception of their own 
lifestyle and themselves as people as the most qualitative. 
The relationship to foreign culture was of specific concern for my xiaozi 
informants not only because of its cultural symbolic but also because of their 
perception that its individualistic lifestyle was preferable to the Chinese traditional 
approach to life, which they experienced was implicated with feelings of 
condemnation, guilt and pressure. Their references to what they perceived as the 
more individually enjoyable lifestyle of the foreigners which they encountered in 
Xintiandi and other places in the city, and their own desire to explore new ways of 
living, thinking and expressing themselves to pursue their personal happiness, was 
something which they often referred to as inherent to the xiaozi attitude to life: 
"Enjoy your life!" Their often strong condemnation of Chinese culture, education 
and parenting methods which they thought left little room for individual 
enjoyment of their own life was continuously countered with comparisons of the 
more casual, relaxed and happy lifestyle which they thought that young 
Westerners enjoy. Simultaneously they were also wary about the difficulties of 
maintaining other 'high quality' characteristics as considered by the surrounding 
society, but mainly revolving around parental expectations, such as marriage, 
property ownership and prestigious careers. The young xiaozi's orientation 
towards Western culture should thus also be understood as an imagined means for 
64
them to pursue a lifestyle which enables more room for individual happiness and 
self-exploration, which they all expressed a desire for but which they perceived as 
not being possible to the same extent within the boundaries of the mainstream
Chinese societal norms. 
I argue that the xiaozi's questioning of normative definitions of what constitutes a 
high quality life and personhood (although such questioning is being implicated 
with their particular structural position in Chinese societal hierarchy), the 
embracing of individual pursuit of happiness and the search for self-identity must
be understood as part of the long-term individualization of Chinese society. All of 
the following traits found in xiaozi subculture; the questioning of societal and 
family norms; the wish to express one's own identity; the search for inspiration 
in foreign or non-mainstream culture; and  the inevitable pressure to choose "a 
life of one's own through conformity" (Beck and Beck and Gernsheim 
2002:151), are very typical of modern youth subculture and are signs of how 
Chinese society is being detraditionalized (Giddens 1984) and how it compels 
the new generation of Chinese to "compulsive and obligatory self-
determination" (Bauman 2000:32). 
Simultaneously the individualization of family relations without individualism in 
China, what Yan describes as how the individual child is the focus of family 
relations and who's upward social mobility is supported, but the determination of 
the individual identity of the child is still deeply embedded in the families social 
identity, norms and tradition (Yan 2009:xxxii), was also visible in the struggles 
which my xiaozi informants experienced when resisting their parents' desire for 
them to establish a middle-class life. The conflict played out both in the practical 
and the normative sense between their parents' wish for them to invest their 
money in marriage and family-owned property and loans on the one hand, and on 
the other hand the children's wish to invest in individually fulfilling things such as 
art, travel and Western fashion, reject the bride wealth tradition, and rent
apartments which can be left at any time. Yan has argued that the key aspect of 
the deep restructuring of Chinese society is the "emergence of a Chinese form of 
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individualism that combines global processes with local processes" (Yan 
2009:xiii), a traction which is especially visible in the externally oriented lifestyle 
of xiaozi youth in Shanghai. While increasingly engaging in and taking part of 
foreign modern cultural practices as a means for self-expression, social distinction 
and upward mobility, my informants were also still deeply implicated with family 
values and expectations to meet the standards of the mainstream discourse on 
quality. Their desire for increased individual emancipation from their family's 
expectations was constantly struggling against their awareness of their 
dependence on their family for social and economic support. Out of all my 
informants it was only Jelena who was about to detach herself from her family by 
means of the ticket out of China which her German boyfriend offered - the others 
still had not chosen path for a more or less individualized future, and it seemed 
likely for most of them that they would pursue a middle-class lifestyle in the 
future - but they wanted to push that moment further into future. 
Such an extension of the youth period in the individual's life-span is a general 
trend in modern societies as a result of increased family wealth, increasingly 
advanced economies and demands of extended education (Sukarieh & Tannock 
2015:115), and perhaps the xiaozi's norms and behavior are emerging as a similar 
response to detraditionalization and change in lifecycle patterns in the 
modernizing China as in other developed countries. But as cross-cultural 
psychological research has shown, individualization as a result of the expanding 
youth period is also dependent on the youth's context-specific social relations. It 
has been proven that Chinese youth spend less autonomous time with their peers 
than with their parents compared with American youth, which also effects their 
individual emancipation and sense of autonomy (Chen et al. 1996; Chen & 
Farruggia 2002). While in the case of China, the importance and power of urban 
youth in effecting social change as consumers of global culture have increased 
with the growth of the Chinese national economy and the subsequent increase in 
family wealth, the opening up to global trade, the decline in birth rates due to the 
one-child policy and the nuclearization of Chinese family relations (ibid.:266), 
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(e.g. structural modernization processes), but the young continue to be reliant on 
their social networks tied to family obligations and social expectations which the 
economic and social investment of two parents and four grandparents accumulate
during an upbringing. The emergence of the xiaozi consumer lifestyle is 
fundamentally dependent upon these factors; and to a large extent supports Yan's 
argument that individual emancipation in China still largely is displayed through 
consumer politics of identity and recognition rather than individualistic 
emancipation (Yan 2009:289). Due to these social structural factors the xiaozi 
youth subculture is specific to the contemporary Chinese context, and therefore it 
is impossible to equal their significance to other Western aspirational youth 
cultures, such as yuppies, hipsters and bobos, without taking the different Chinese 
structural societal factors into account. The strong desire for individual 
emancipation which my informants expressed and which they defined as a core 
value of xiaozi youth was described as the right to pursue one's own personal 
happiness, which currently is restrained by the determination to take part in fierce 
social competition coupled with dependence on and expectations from one's social 
network. The struggles among my informants of how to accomplish social upward 
mobility and personal happiness by attempting at shifting, and not just adhering 
to, societal norms and family expectations are signs of how Chinese youth are 
becoming more individual-oriented.
6. Conclusions
In the light of Bourdieu's theory on social distinction (1984), the behavior of the 
xiaozi youth appears as a viable consumerist strategy for higher social status 
attainment in a contemporary Chinese society which is marked by fierce 
competition for social upward mobility, structural socioeconomic obstacles and 
high expectations on urban youth for social and economic success. But in contrast 
to earlier scholars who have studied this type of social distinction in China, I 
argue that 'cosmopolitanism' is the wrong academic term to use to describe the 
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cultural capital which is associated with particular foreign cultural practices in 
China. As my findings show, it is not only a transnationally connected Chinese 
elite which take on and appropriate foreign cultural practices, but also lower 
middle-class individuals who want to assert themselves as 'cosmopolites'. This 
also challenges Song & Lee's (2012) argument that it is the Chinese elite who well 
can afford such a lifestyle that appropriate foreign styles and manners. Rather than 
just applying the mainstream academic discourse on 'cosmopolitanism as cultural 
capital in a globalizing world' to the Chinese domestic context, it seems more 
constructive to study globalization and cultural change through the lens of
Friedman's theory (2000) on how symbolically global cultural production is 
structured by local social relations, to understand how different foreign cultural 
practices are being adopted into Chinese urban culture (and the rural, but within 
yet another local cultural field) and what meanings global symbolism gains in the 
local Chinese context. For example, the popularity of the global franchise 
Starbucks in China could not be explained by an innate fondness for coffee among 
the Chinese populace, but must be analyzed with an understanding of how coffee 
has gained an associated meaning to the abstract concept 'modernity' in urban 
China, and how the desire which Chinese urban youth has to establish what they 
perceive as a modern identity and lifestyle creates its symbolic and highly 
marketable value. The xiaozi's consumption strategy to capitalize on such 
symbolic meanings to assert themselves as the ultimate Chinese modern 
individual evidently is structured by the importance of recognition of quality as 
the determinant factor of social worth in contemporary Chinese society; their 
limited amount of other possibilities to gain such social status; and the quality 
discourse's implication with Chinese ideas of modernity. Such a complex local 
process of adoption of global consumer culture is poorly served by being 
conflated with the term 'cosmopolitanism'. My informants saw themselves as 
'modern', not 'cosmopolites', and the sort of consumption habits which Rofel, 
Song and Lee describes as a consumptive adoption of a cosmopolitan identity is 
mostly referred to as Westernization, not 'cosmopolitanism', among the Chinese 
people I've discussed the matter with. Thus the term 'cosmopolitanism' seems to 
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be a misleading terminological short-cut which does not well grasp and express 
the empirical cultural change which globalization is affecting in urban China, and 
should be used with heightened precaution. 
The xiaozi's attempt to distinguish themselves through very particular 
consumption choices also supports Yan's (2009) argument that consumerism and 
its politics for recognition is a crucial process for individual identity formation for 
Chinese youth in a time and societal structure when possibilities for individual 
emancipation from social relations and personal networks remain limited, and 
social mobility is so dependent on personal social relations. However, this study 
also shows a tendency among Chinese xiaozi youth to want to break away from 
traditional social relations and gain more individual freedom beyond their means 
as consumers, although this desire for emancipation is coupled with issues of 
dependence. Such normative change and struggle among the younger generation 
along with Chinese society's structural modernization is a case example of the 
current individualization of Chinese social relations. These changes ought to be
continued to be studied to add insights to the individualization theory (Bauman 
2002; Beck 1992; Beck & Gernsheim 2002) from a Chinese modernization
perspective.
Of what cultural significance is the xiaozi's challenge of the normative middle-
class imperative in Chinese society? Are their self-perceived role as the "new 
generation" only pretentious, or are their values a message of social change in 
urban China? Are their social codes becoming dominant in Chinese urban social 
life, giving new structure to personal lives of young individuals? Considering that 
xiaozi predominantly is considered a positive and desirable social label it seems as 
if they do have the ability to have impact on norms and values in Shanghai. 
Furthermore, the xiaozi's increased will to spend rather than save to invest in the 
skyrocketing real-estate market is also a sign of changing consumption habits in 
urban China, a change in spending which the Chinese government is promoting as 
the Chinese economy ought to shift from an industrial production-driven 
economic model to a service consumption-driven economic model, to sustain 
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domestic growth. The high symbolic value of consumption choices in Chinese 
society as means for expressing quality and establishing social status and social 
worth is probably the strongest drive for Chinese individuals, such as the xiaozi, 
to change their consumption habits - to buy a coffee at Starbucks or a drink at 
Yongkang Road to socialize with foreigners, instead of putting all savings in the 
bank account for later investment in property and bride wealth. 
Further studies of xiaozi youth in other Chinese cities would be needed to map to 
what extent the xiaozi lifestyle and values are diffusing in contemporary China, 
for example in Beijing and Guangzhou but also other less international cities such 
as Shenzhen, Chengdu, Nanjing and Chongqing, to determine the external validity 
of my findings of xiaozi culture in Shanghai. It would also be instructive to study 
the xiaozi subculture from a gender perspective since it is mainly women who 
seek to embrace a xiaozi lifestyle; to explore its rationale and how this relates to 
changing gender relations in urban China when young women increasingly gain
power as professionals and consumers. Another suggestion would be to conduct a 
comparative study of the creative class in the US (Brooks 2000; Florida 2002) and 
the xiaozi in China, in order to explore what connections and differences which 
appear when analyzed from a global systemic perspective; for example how class-
struggles and societal composition change with the emergence of information 
societies and increasing globalization.
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Appendix I
Questionnaire for guided conversations:
- What means xiaozi to you?
- How would you describe a xiaozi person?
- For how long have you known about the concept?
- How do xiaozi youth differ from middle-class youth?
- Is xiaozi a positive or negative thing to you?
- What do you think is the reason for why xiaozi people choose to live the xiaozi 
lifestyle?
- How is the quality of xiaozi people? Compared to middle-class people?
